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To Report or Not to Report:
Data on School Law Enforcement,
Student Discipline, Race, and the
“School-to-Prison Pipeline”
Michael Heise and Jason P. Nance*
The “school-to-prison pipeline” wreaks havoc on the lives of thousands of
students each year, particularly with respect to students of color. While the
effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on the school-to-prison pipeline remain
unclear, the eventual return to full in-person teaching nationwide
undoubtedly will renew this long-festering problem. The presence of law
enforcement officers in schools is a key component of the school-to-prison
pipeline and has generated considerable recent national attention,
especially after George Floyd’s tragic death in the spring of 2020. Indeed,
several robust empirical studies document that the increased presence of
school resource (and/or police) officers in a school corresponds with an
increased likelihood that a school will report various types of student
disciplinary incidents to law enforcement agencies. This trend is troubling.
Empirical studies demonstrate that when students become involved in the
criminal justice system there are potentially severe implications.
This Article furthers the school-to-prison pipeline scholarly literature in
at least two critical ways. First, the current literature’s understandable
focus on school reporting behaviors entirely ignores school decisions to not
report student incidents to law enforcement agencies. We address this gap
by comparing determinants of schools’ decisions to report and to not report
student disciplinary matters to law enforcement agencies. In so doing we
provide greater clarity on how schools exercise their institutional discretion
in the student disciplinary context. What we find, on balance, is that schools
with a comparatively greater SRO/police presence are systematically more
* Copyright © 2021 Michael Heise and Jason P. Nance. Michael Heise is William
G. McRoberts Professor in the Empirical Study of Law, Cornell Law School; Jason P.
Nance is Professor of Law, University of Florida Levin College of Law. Author
correspondence: michael.heise@cornell.edu.
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inclined to report than exercise discretion and not report student
disciplinary incidents.
Second, this Article provides greater insight into the complexities
associated with race, student discipline, and the context for which the
pernicious effects of implicit racial bias may have the greatest influence on
student disciplinary outcomes. Troubling racial inequalities in the public
school system abound — particularly with respect to student discipline. Yet,
we find that the overall concentration of students of color in a school largely
does not influence the rate at which schools report students to law
enforcement or when schools decide to exercise institutional discretion and
not report. On its face, this finding is inconsistent with the prominent
normative literature. However, it comports with our general understanding
of how implicit racial bias operates and its nuanced effects in the school
disciplinary context. Specifically, when disciplinary incidents require
school officials to subjectively characterize student behavior (e.g., defiance,
disrespect, disruption), the effects of implicit racial bias are more
pronounced, often producing significant inequitable outcomes. In contrast,
when less characterization is required, (e.g., possession of drugs or
weapons, fighting, theft), which is the basis for most student referrals to law
enforcement, the effects of implicit racial bias are often mitigated, resulting
in fewer racial equity concerns.
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INTRODUCTION
The eventual full resumption of in-person school instruction will
inevitably lead to a resumption of in-school student disciplinary
incidents. A resumption of in-school student disciplinary incidents will
renew public focus on, and a growing unease with, how schools address
student disciplinary matters, especially non-violent student incidents.1
At the heart of this debate resides a question of whether and, if so, when
school administrators should engage law enforcement agencies.2
Indeed, George Floyd’s tragic death has precipitated a nationwide
debate focused on, among many other important national issues, what
role police officers should have in schools or whether they belong in
schools at all.3

1 See, e.g., Derek W. Black, Reforming School Discipline, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 3-4
(2016) (criticizing schools’ punitive approach to school discipline); Jason P. Nance,
Dismantling the School-to-Prison Pipeline: Tools for Change, 48 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 313, 315317 (2016) [hereinafter Dismantling the School-to-Prison Pipeline] (describing the
tightened intersection between schools and the criminal justice system for student
misbehavior, including for non-violent student offenses).
2 See Kristin Henning, Criminalizing Normal Adolescent Behavior in Communities of
Color: The Role of Prosecutors in Juvenile Justice Reform, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 383, 410-11
(2013) (“Whereas schoolteachers, principals, and school counselors once handled
school-based incidents such as fighting, disorderly conduct, and destruction of property
in school, school officials now rely on local police or in-house SROs to handle even the
most minor of school infractions.”).
3 Do Police Officers in Schools Help or Hinder Teachers?, ECONOMIST (July 18, 2020),
https://www.economist.com/united-states/2020/07/18/do-police-officers-in-schoolshelp-or-hinder-teachers [https://perma.cc/W3LH-ZRUT]. Following the death of
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Schools addressing a student discipline incident that does not trigger
any mandatory reporting obligations to law enforcement agencies —
but nonetheless plausibly falls within the school’s discretion to report
— confront a critical question: to report or not to report the student
incident to law enforcement agencies. How school administrators
resolve this question potentially poses enormous consequences for a
student’s future, as well as the school’s reputation for safety, crime, and
discipline.4
A growing empirical “school-to-prison pipeline”5 literature assessing
the consequences of schools’ increasingly legalized approach to student
discipline typically — and understandably — focuses on school reports
of student discipline incidents to law enforcement agencies. Given the
potentially severe implications for individual students and their futures,
the focus on school reports to law enforcement agencies is as predictable
as it is warranted.6 This is especially so if schools’ motivations to engage
law enforcement include a desire to functionally outsource
responsibility for student discipline to law enforcement agencies.7
Making matters arguably worse is that school referrals of student
incidents — particularly “lower-level” non-violent student incidents
that historically were handled internally by school officials — often set
into motion a series of legal events that can culminate in ways that
negatively impact students’ lives going forward, as well as schools’
reputations (real or perceived) for safety and control.8 Adding to these
George Floyd and the related protests, several school districts throughout the country
severely cut or altogether ended their contracts with police departments. Id.
4 See infra Parts I.E., I.F.
5 The term “school-to-prison pipeline” refers to the tightened intersection between
schools and the criminal justice system and the trend of referring students to law
enforcement for committing various offenses at school or fostering conditions that
facilitate more student involvement in the criminal justice system, such as suspending
and expelling students. Jason P. Nance, Students, Police, and the School-to-Prison
Pipeline, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 919, 923 (2016) [hereinafter Students, Police]; see also
Hawker v. Sandy City Corp., 774 F.3d 1243, 1245 (10th Cir. 2014) (Lucero, J.,
concurring) (quoting Jason P. Nance, School Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment,
2014 WIS. L. REV. 79, 83 (2014)).
6 See Michael Heise & Jason P. Nance, “Defund the (School) Police”?: Bringing Data
to Key School-to-Prison Pipeline Claims, 111 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 717, 720 (2021)
[hereinafter “Defund the (School) Police”?]; see infra Part I.E.
7 See, e.g., Emma Brown, Police in Schools: Keeping Kids Safe, or Arresting Them for
No Good Reason?, WASH. POST (Nov. 8, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/
education/police-in-schools-keeping-kids-safe-or-arresting-them-for-no-good-reason/
2015/11/08/937ddfd0-816c-11e5-9afb-0c971f713d0c_story.html [https://perma.cc/73MFC3TN] (describing an incident where a teacher called a police officer into the classroom
to manage a student who was using a cell phone in class).
8 See infra Parts I.E., I.F.
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troubling outcomes is the reality that students of color often suffer
disproportionately from the tightened intersection between schools and
the criminal justice system, further exacerbating racial inequalities in
our nation.9
When it comes to the growing student resource officer and police
officer (“SRO/police”) presence and influence in public schools, two
general claims dominate the current research literature. One claim is
that as a school’s SRO/police presence increases, so too does the
probability that the school will report student discipline incidents to
enforcement agencies.10 A second claim asserts that school reports to
law enforcement distribute unevenly across various student groups,
with particularly deleterious consequences for students of color, boys,
students from low-income households, and other student sub-groups.11
In our prior research, we found generally mixed empirical support
when these two general claims are subject to data from the nation’s
leading cross-sectional dataset on public school crime and safety, the
2016 U.S. Department of Education’s 2015–16 School Survey on Crime
and Safety (“SSOCS”).12 With respect to the first claim, we found
evidence that a school’s SRO/police presence corresponds with an
increased probability that the school will report student disciplinary
incidents to law enforcement agencies.13 This finding troubles because
9

See Nance, Dismantling the School-to-Prison Pipeline, supra note 1, at 331-36.
See Chongmin Na & Denise C. Gottfredson, Police Officers in Schools: Effects on
School Crime and the Processing of Offending Behaviors, 30 JUST. Q. 619, 636-40 (2013);
Nance, Students, Police, supra note 5, at 958-73.
11 See e.g., Janel George, Populating the Pipeline: School Policing and the Persistence
of the School-to-Prison Pipeline, 40 NOVA L. REV. 493, 494 (2017) (arguing that “children
of color and low-income children . . . are disproportionately targeted for referral and
arrest by police in schools”); Amanda Merkwae, Schooling the Police: Race, Disability,
and the Conduct of School Resource Officers, 21 MICH. J. RACE & L. 147, 180 (2015)
(concluding that “there is overwhelming evidence suggesting that students of color and
students with disabilities are funneled into the justice system due to the disparate
impact of exclusionary discipline polices and discretionary arrests in schools”);
Matthew T. Theriot, School Resource Officers and the Criminalization of Student Behavior,
37 J. CRIM. JUST. 280, 285-86 (2009) (finding evidence of a relation between school
poverty levels and number of student arrests).
12 See, e.g., Heise & Nance, “Defund the (School) Police”?, supra note 6 (using 2015–
16 SSOCS data set); Michael Heise & Jason P. Nance, Following Data: The “Defund the
Police” Movement’s Implications for Elementary and Secondary Schools, 110 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY ONLINE 63, 67 (2020) [hereinafter Following Data] (using 2015–16 SSOCS
data set); Nance, Students, Police, supra note 5, at 958-59 (using 2009–10 SSOCS data
set). Various results discussed in this Article also derive from the 2009–2010 and the
2017–2018 restricted-use versions of the SSOCS data series.
13 See Heise & Nance, “Defund the (School) Police”?, supra note 6, at 721-22; see also
Na & Gottfredson, supra note 10, at 626, 642 (using various SSOCS data sets); Nance,
10

214

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 55:209

of the severe consequences that flow into the lives of students when
they become involved in the criminal justice system.14
On the other hand, we did not find persuasive empirical support, at
least direct support, for the second claim. Specifically, at the school
level, student incidents reported to law enforcement systematically did
not distribute unevenly across various student sub-groups, including
students of color (e.g., the overall concentration of minority students in
a school did not influence the rate at which schools report students to
law enforcement).15 It is important to emphasize, however, that the
SSOCS data set does not contain demographic data (e.g., race/ethnicity,
gender, socio-economic status) on the individual students whose
conduct triggered a school referral to law enforcement agencies.16 Thus,
at one level, the persistent claims that school reports to law enforcement
agencies systematically distribute unevenly across various student subgroups certainly remain viable — indeed, supportive anecdotal and
related evidence exists.17 Our narrower point, however, is that as it
relates to the specific claim that referrals to law enforcement raises
troubling distributional issues at the school level, such an assertion does
not — and cannot — find direct empirical support from the nation’s

Students, Police, supra note 5, at 919; Mario S. Torres Jr., & Jacqueline A. Stefkovich,
Demographics and Police Involvement: Implications for Student Civil Liberties and Just
Leadership, 45 EDUC. ADMIN. Q. 450, 466-67 (2009) (using 1999–2000 SSOCS data set).
14 See Nance, Students, Police, supra note 5, at 952-57; see also infra Part I.E.
15 See Heise & Nance, “Defund the (School) Police”?, supra note 6, at 722-23.
16 See, e.g., id. at 722 (SSOCS demographic data presented at the school-level); Na
& Gottfredson, supra note 10 (same); Nance, Students, Police, supra note 5 (using 2009–
10 SSOCS data); Torres Jr. & Stefkovich, supra note 13 (using 1999–2000 SSOCS data).
17 See, e.g., Nance, Students, Police, supra note 5, at 973 (noting that while the
SSOCS data do not permit identification of the students who were actually referred to
law enforcement, it remains “entirely possible” that the school referrals were
“disproportionately students of color”); see also DANIEL J. LOSEN, NAT’L EDUC. POL’Y CTR.,
DISCIPLINE POLICIES, SUCCESSFUL SCHOOLS, AND RACIAL JUSTICE 6-7 (2011); Catherine P.
Bradshaw, Mary M. Mitchell, Lindsey M. O’Brennan & Philip J. Leaf, Multilevel
Exploration of Factors Contributing to the Overrepresentation of Black Students in Office
Disciplinary Referrals, 102 J. EDUC. PSYCH. 508, 508 (2010) (discovering that after
controlling for teacher ratings of students’ behavior problems, African-American
students were more likely than white students to be referred to the office for disciplinary
reasons); Michael Rocque & Raymond Paternoster, Understanding the Antecedents of the
“School-to-Jail” Link: The Relationship Between Race and School Discipline, 101 J. CRIM L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 633, 653-54 (2011) (documenting that African-American students are
more likely than white students to be disciplined even after taking into account other
salient factors such as grades, attitudes, gender, special education or language programs,
and their conduct in school).
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leading school safety and violence data set.18 Moreover, if anything, the
weight of existing indirect school-level evidence does not generally hint
at any troubling distributional outcomes.19
Our finding that the overall concentration of students of color in a
school largely does not influence the rate at which schools report
students to law enforcement may surprise many, especially because
racial inequalities are pervasive in our public school system, criminal
justice system, and in many other areas of our society.20 Yet this finding
actually comports with our general understanding of how implicit racial
bias influences decision-making, especially in the school disciplinary
context. Specifically, when disciplinary incidents require school
authorities to subjectively characterize behavior (e.g., defiance,
disrespect, disruption), the effects of implicit racial bias are more
pronounced, often resulting in significant inequitable outcomes.21 But
when less characterization is required (e.g., possession of drugs,
fighting, theft), which is the basis of the vast majority of referrals to law
enforcement, the effects of implicit bias often are muted, resulting in
fewer racial equity concerns.22
The primary motivation for this Article flows from the reality that the
empirical school-to-prison pipeline research’s focus on school reports
of student incidents to law enforcement agencies entirely ignores a
potential outcome of equal import: school decisions to not report; that
18 We note that language in at least one published paper, using earlier versions of
the SSOCS data set, invites some level of confusion by potentially advancing claims,
albeit tentatively, about the disproportionate impacts on minority student sub-groups
based on data on schools’ overall racial/ethnic, gender, and special education needs
compositions. See Na & Gottfredson, supra note 10, at 641 (“We conclude that the
results of our tests of interaction with percent in special education and percentage
minority do not suggest a pattern of disproportionate impact of police use on socially
or educationally disadvantaged populations.”). While perhaps such analyses provide
not-implausible inferential support, without individual-level racial/ethnic, gender, and
special education needs data on the actual students referred to law enforcement
agencies, more efficacious and helpful conclusions are simply not possible given the
data limitations. Contributing to the confusion is that the Na & Gottfredson paper is
aware of the unit of analysis limitation in the SSOCS data sets. See id. at 641-42
(“However, finer-grained analyses conducted at the individual-level might uncover
patterns that our school-level data could not.”).
19 See, e.g., Na & Gottfredson, supra note 10, at 626-27, 641 (analyzing 2003–04,
2005–06, and 2007–08 SSOCS data sets); Nance, Students, Police, supra note 5, at 973
(analyzing 2009-10 SSOCS data).
20 See Jason P. Nance, Student Surveillance, Racial Inequalities, and Implicit Racial
Bias, 66 EMORY L.J. 765, 811-16 (2017) [hereinafter Student Surveillance]; Nance,
Students, Police, supra note 5, at 971-73.
21 See infra Part I.H.
22 See infra Part I.H.
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is, where school administrators exercise discretion, decide against
formally engaging law enforcement, and handle a student disciplinary
incident internally. Given the growing SRO/police presence in public
schools and its prominence in the “school-to-prison pipeline” debate,23
we are especially interested in assessing the extent to which, if any, a
school’s SRO/police presence informs the school administrators’
exercise of discretion when it comes to reporting student incidents to
law enforcement agencies. In other words, this study’s principal
scholarly contribution emerges from expanding the analytic sweep of
school-to-prison pipeline research to include an assessment of a school’s
probability of not referring student incidents to law enforcement
agencies. Indeed, comparing how schools’ reporting and non-reporting
rates distribute provides helpful insights into how schools exercise
institutional discretion in the student discipline context. What we find,
on balance, is that schools with a comparatively greater SRO/police
presence are systematically more inclined to report rather than exercise
discretion and non-report student disciplinary incidents.
A second important contribution of this study is that it further
illuminates the complexities associated with race and student
discipline. More specifically, because nonreporting contexts invite
heightened discretion, and discretion is a key condition that often
triggers the effects of implicit racial bias,24 one might expect to find
greater racial disparities relating to nonreporting decisions for various
disciplinary offenses. However, similar to the school reporting context,
we find that the overall concentration of students of color in a school
largely does not influence when schools decide to exercise institutional
discretion and not report to law enforcement.25 Once again, this may
occur because offenses normally subject to a potential report to law
enforcement typically require more objectively defined judgment (e.g.,
possession of weapons or drugs, fighting, theft) that is less susceptible
to the influences of bias.26
Our Article unfolds as follows. Part I briefly summarizes the relevant
research literatures. In Part II we set out our data, research design, and

23

See infra Part I.C.
See Jerry Kang, Judge Mark Bennett, Devon Carbado, Pam Casey, Nilanjana
Dasgupta, David Faigman, Rachel Godsil, Anthony G. Greenwald, Justin Levinson &
Jennifer Mnookin, Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1142 (2012)
(explaining that “the conditions under which implicit biases translate most readily into
discriminatory behavior are when people have wide discretion in making quick
decisions with little accountability”).
25 See infra Parts III.B., IV.
26 See infra Parts III.B., IV.
24
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empirical strategy. We present our results in Parts III and IV and
consider their legal and policy implications. We conclude in Part V and
discuss possible next steps for this line of research.
I.

LITERATURE REVIEW

While our Article seeks to further the current relevant empirical
literature, it also is situated in other related research literatures that
provide important context to our empirical findings. Specifically, many
scholars have written about schools’ increased “legalized” approach to
school discipline and safety, explaining its manifestations, the reasons
behind this trend, and its consequences to students and our
communities. While much less has been written about school officials’
decisions to not report student wrongdoing to law enforcement
authorities, there is much more literature on how educators’
discretionary decision-making contributes to racial inequalities in our
public school system, including by way of implicit racial bias. The
literature also describes how the effects of implicit bias can be more
pronounced in certain disciplinary contexts than in others.
A. The Trend Towards a “Legalized” Approach to School Discipline and
Safety
Over the last several decades, many policymakers and schools have
taken an increased “legalized” approach to school discipline and
maintaining safe, orderly campuses.27 This trend has manifested itself
in several ways. First, schools are presently more inclined than in the
past to rely on criminal justice-oriented security measures to monitor
students and deter wrongdoing.28 For example, it is not uncommon
today for schools to install security cameras, metal detectors, locked
gates and doors, have drug-sniffing dogs, hire law enforcement officers
and security guards to patrol school grounds, and conduct random
searches of students’ lockers and belongings for illegal contraband.29 In
fact, many schools rely on various combinations of these criminal
27 See AARON KUPCHIK, THE REAL SCHOOL SAFETY PROBLEM: THE LONG-TERM
CONSEQUENCES OF HARSH SCHOOL PUNISHMENT 1-10 (2016); Kelly Welch, School-toPrison Pipeline, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND JUSTICE 765-66
(Christopher J. Schreck ed., 2018).
28 See Jason P. Nance, Implicit Racial Bias and Students’ Fourth Amendment Rights, 94
IND. L.J. 47, 48-54 (2019) [hereinafter Implicit Racial Bias].
29 See MELISSA DILIBERTI, MICHAEL JACKSON, SAMUEL CORREA, ZOE PADGETT & RACHEL
HANSEN, CRIME, VIOLENCE, DISCIPLINE, AND SAFETY IN U.S. PUBLIC SCHOOLS 13 tbl.7
(2019).
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justice-oriented security measures, which, some argue, can resemble an
intense, prison-like environment for students that may be antithetical
to students’ overall well-being and growth.30
Second, many policymakers and schools have increasingly supported
exclusionary disciplinary practices to help maintain order and control.
For example, many states have enacted statutes that require schools to
report students to law enforcement for engaging in various types of
criminal activities at school, including possession of weapons, assault,
theft, vandalism, possession of drugs or alcohol, and sexual assault.31
Some states require schools to report students to law enforcement for
committing any crime, including misdemeanors.32 Other states have
enacted so-called “disturbing school statutes,” which can criminalize
common adolescent misbehavior.33 Still other state statutes require
schools to suspend or expel students for engaging in various acts of
wrongdoing while at school.34 Of course, even when school authorities
are not statutorily required to suspend, expel, or report students to law
enforcement authorities for committing certain acts, school districts
and individual schools have their own policies and practices for
invoking these exclusionary disciplinary practices.35 Empirical evidence
30 See Heise & Nance, “Defund the (School) Police”?, supra note 6, at 724-25; Paul J.
Hirschfield, Preparing for Prison?: The Criminalization of School Discipline in the USA, 12
THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 79, 79-80 (2008); Nance, Students, Police, supra note 5, at
937-38.
31 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-341 (2021) (mandating reports for sexual
assault); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-1184(a), (b) (2021) (mandating reports for drug
possession); HAW. REV. STAT. § 302A-1002(1)(b) (2021) (mandating reporting for
theft); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 158.154 (2021) (mandating reporting for vandalism).
32 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 14.33.130(b) (2021) (mandating reports of all crimes to
law enforcement); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-6143(b)(1) (2021) (mandating reports of all
felonies and misdemeanors); MD. CODE REGS. 13A.08.01.15 (2021) (mandating reports
of all “delinquent acts . . . which would be crimes if committed by an adult”).
33 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2911 (2021) (criminalizing “intentionally,
knowingly or recklessly interfering with or disrupting the normal operations of an
educational institution”); CAL. PENAL CODE § 415.5 (2021) (criminalizing fights and
malicious and willful disturbances by loud and unreasonable noise in schools); FLA.
STAT. § 871.01(1) (2021) (criminalizing acts that “willfully interrupts or disturbs any
school”); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 28A.635.030 (2021) (criminalizing acts that
“willfully create a disturbance on school premises during school hours or at school
activities or school meetings”); see also Josh Gupta-Kagan, The School-to-Prison
Pipeline’s Legal Architecture: Lessons from the Spring Valley Incident and Its Aftermath, 45
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 83, 103 (2017) [hereinafter The School-to-Prison Pipeline].
34 See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 282.4 (2021) (requiring suspension of a student who
“commits an assault . . . against a school employee in a school building”).
35 See, e.g., CHI. PUB. SCHS., STUDENTS RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 7-13 (2020)
(describing disciplinary policies for suspensions, expulsions, and referrals to law
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demonstrates that schools presently rely much more on exclusionary
discipline policies than in prior years.36
Zero tolerance policies are another form of exclusionary discipline
that have captured extensive national attention in the media and
academic literature over the last two decades.37 Zero tolerance policies
require school officials to administer pre-determined consequences,
such as suspending, expelling, or referring students to law enforcement
for engaging in certain acts without taking into consideration the
severity of, the reasons for, or the consequences of the behavior.38 Zero
tolerance policies, which originated from the Gun-Free Schools Act of
1994, required schools to suspend students for at least one year for
possessing a firearm on campus in order to receive federal funding.39
Following the federal government’s implicit endorsement of zero
tolerance policies, school districts across the country began extending
these policies to conduct well beyond firearm possession at school.40
For example, schools have enacted zero tolerance policies to apply to
such student conduct as possessing drugs and alcohol, tardiness,
possessing sharp objects, dress code violations, and fighting.41 As a
result, some students have received extreme forms of discipline for
relatively minor incidents, such as bringing over-the-counter
medication to school, possessing scissors, fingernail clippers, or a
pocketknife, drawing pictures of weapons, writing a violent story,
making shooting gestures, or uttering threatening phrases.42 Scholars
have characterized zero tolerance policies as harmful to students and

enforcement); HOUS. INDEP. SCH. DIST., 2019–2020 CODE OF STUDENT CONDUCT 12-13,
16 (2019) (describing disciplinary policies for suspensions, expulsions, and referrals to
law enforcement).
36 See Nance, Dismantling the School-to-Prison Pipeline, supra note 1, at 316-17.
37 See F. Chris Curran, Just What Are ‘Zero Tolerance’ Policies — and Are They Still
Common in American’s Schools?, CONVERSATION (Feb. 14, 2019, 6:48 AM EST),
https://theconversation.com/just-what-are-zero-tolerance-policies-and-are-they-stillcommon-in-americas-schools-111039 [https://perma.cc/HUV9-SX5A]. See generally
DEREK W. BLACK, ENDING ZERO TOLERANCE: THE CRISIS OF ABSOLUTE SCHOOL DISCIPLINE
(2016) (describing the rise of zero tolerance policies and the negative effects such
policies have on students).
38 Am. Psych. Ass’n Zero Tolerance Task Force, Are Zero Tolerance Policies Effective
in Schools? An Evidentiary Review and Recommendations, 63 AM. PSYCH. 852, 852 (2008).
39 20 U.S.C. § 7961 (2021).
40 See Udi Ofer, Criminalizing the Classroom: The Rise of Aggressive Policing and Zero
Tolerance in New York City Public Schools, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1373, 1376 (2012).
41 See CATHERINE Y. KIM, DANIEL J. LOSEN & DAMON T. HEWITT, THE SCHOOL-TOPRISON PIPELINE: STRUCTURING LEGAL REFORM 79-80 (2010).
42 See BLACK, supra note 37, at 2-4.
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schools and unnecessarily propelling students on a pathway that may
lead to deeper involvement in the criminal justice system.43
B. Why Schools Have Taken an Increased “Legalized” Approach to
School Discipline and Safety
Scholars have proposed several closely tied theories explaining why
schools have taken an increasingly “legalized” approach to school
discipline and safety.44 Perhaps the greatest catalyst for an increased
legalized approach includes the highly-publicized events of school
violence that have occurred over the last two decades, such as the
shootings in Columbine High School, Newtown Elementary School,
and Parkland High School.45 These tragic incidents of school violence
provoked great fear, sadness, anger, and a collective resolve to make
schools safer.46 In turn, this put enormous pressure on school officials
to demonstrate to parents, policymakers, and broader communities that
they were taking concrete measures to foster safer learning
environments.47 For many school authorities the most effective way to
tangibly demonstrate a commitment to school safety was to hire more
police officers and security guards and install other safety measures,

43 See ADVANCEMENT PROJECT & C.R. PROJECT, HARVARD UNIV., OPPORTUNITIES
SUSPENDED: THE DEVASTATING CONSEQUENCES OF ZERO TOLERANCE AND SCHOOL
DISCIPLINE 17 (2000); Am. Psych. Ass’n Zero Tolerance Task Force, supra note 38, at
857; Derek W. Black, The Constitutional Limit of Zero Tolerance in Schools, 99 MINN. L.
REV. 823, 837-41 (2014); see also Heise & Nance, “Defund the (School) Police”?, supra
note 6, at 727-28.
44 For an extended discussion of these reasons, see Nance, Students, Police, supra
note 5, at 929-45; Heise & Nance, “Defund the (School) Police”?, supra note 6 at 732.
45 See Elizabeth S. Scott, Miller v. Alabama and the (Past and) Future of Juvenile Crime
Regulation, 31 MINN. J. L. & INEQ. 535, 541 (2013) (explaining that after the Columbine
shootings “legislatures across the country rushed to pass strict zero tolerance laws,
making it a crime to threaten violence in school[s]”).
46 See Lynh Bui, Montgomery County Parents Ask for More School Security, Teacher
Training During Budget Hearing, WASH. POST (Jan. 11, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.
com/blogs/maryland-schoolsinsider/post/montgomery-county-parents-ask-for-moreschoolsecurity-teacher-training-during-budget-hearing/2013/01/11/e8d3dcf4-5aab-11e29fa9-5fbdc9530eb9_blog.html [https://perma.cc/LD9N-MTLB]; Motoko Rich, School
Officials Look Again at Security Measures Once Dismissed, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2012),
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/19/education/after-newtown-shootings-schoolsconsider-armed-security-officers.html [https://perma.cc/ZB34-LG3U].
47 See Torin Monahan & Rodolfo D. Torres, Introduction, in SCHOOLS UNDER
SURVEILLANCE: CULTURES OF CONTROL IN PUBLIC EDUCATION 2-3 (Torin Monahan &
Rodolfo D. Torres eds., 2009); cf. Randall R. Beger, The “Worst of Both Worlds”: School
Security and the Disappearing Fourth Amendment Rights of Students, 28 CRIM. JUST. REV.
336, 338 (2003) (discussing public fear about school violence).
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such as surveillance cameras, locked doors and gates, and metal
detectors.48
Scholars also point to the general “tough on crime” mindset that has
permeated our society over the last several decades as another driving
force behind a more “legalized” approach to school discipline.49 For
decades, legislative and executive bodies have focused on punishment
and control instead of rehabilitating adult and youth offenders,
especially when youth crime rates escalated from the mid-1980s to
1994.50 Scholars observe that governing bodies and school authorities
took a similar approach to address student offenders.51 Rather than
focusing on rehabilitation, schools relied heavily on punitive and
exclusionary discipline practices such as suspension, expulsion, and
referring students to law enforcement for wrongdoing.52
Other scholars maintain that schools have taken an increased
“legalized” approach to school discipline because educators lack
resources to adequately address students’ needs and create an orderly
learning environment.53 Educators are often charged with teaching
students who are malnourished, suffer from trauma and abuse, lack
structure in their home environments, have learning disabilities and
behavioral disorders, lack support, and do not have access to adequate
health care.54 Other students do not fully understand the purpose of

48

See Heise & Nance, “Defund the (School) Police”?, supra note 6, at 732-33.
See Donna M. Bishop & Barry C. Feld, Juvenile Justice in the Get Tough Era, in
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 2766, 2768 (Gerben Bruinsma &
Davis Weisburd eds., 2014).
50 See BARRY C. FELD, BAD KIDS: RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE JUVENILE
COURT 189-90 (1999); PATRICIA TORBET, RICHARD GABLE, HUNTER HURST IV, IMOGENE
MONTGOMERY, LINDA SZYMANSKI & DOUGLAS THOMAS, STATE RESPONSES TO SERIOUS AND
VIOLENT JUVENILE CRIME, at xi (1996); Elizabeth S. Scott, “Children Are Different”:
Constitutional Values and Justice Policy, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 71, 94 (2013).
51 See KATHLEEN NOLAN, POLICE IN THE HALLWAYS: DISCIPLINE IN AN URBAN HIGH
SCHOOL 164 (2011); Henry A. Giroux, Racial Injustice and Disposable Youth in the Age of
Zero Tolerance, 16 QUALITATIVE STUD. EDUC. 553, 561 (2003); Hirschfield, supra note
30, at 90.
52 See Barbara Fedders, The Anti-Pipeline Collaborative, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 565,
567-68 (2016); see also Heise & Nance, “Defund the (School) Police”?, supra note 6, at
733-34.
53 See Hirschfield, supra note 30, at 92; cf. Pedro A. Noguera, Schools, Prisons, and
Social Implications of Punishment: Rethinking Disciplinary Practices, 42 J. THEORY INTO
PRAC. 341, 346 (2003) (discussing the use of suspension/expulsion to maintain order
in schools).
54 See DIANE RAVITCH, REIGN OF ERROR: THE HOAX OF THE PRIVATIZATION MOVEMENT
AND THE DANGER TO AMERICA’S PUBLIC SCHOOLS 290-91 (2013); Linda DarlingHammond, Inequality and School Resources: What It Will Take to Close the Opportunity
49
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education or, even when they do, do not believe that they can be
successful even if they fully commit to the academic process.55 When
students fall behind, become frustrated or bored, do not feel that the
system is working for them, or are harassed by their peers, they often
misbehave.56 Lacking resources to address struggling students’
underlying needs, some schools overly rely on exclusionary discipline
tactics, such as referring students to law enforcement, to push difficult,
misbehaving students out of school in an attempt to stabilize the
learning environment.57
Finally, scholars observe that some schools have adopted an increased
“legalized approach” in response to external pressures to increase
student achievement on standardized exams.58 Federal education
statutes such as the now-defunct “No Child Left Behind Act” and the
current “Every Student Succeeds Act” require schools to regularly test
students in exchange for federal education dollars.59 When schools fail
to meet certain academic standards, they may be subject to negative
labels or sanctions, putting tremendous pressure on school authorities
and educators to help students perform adequately on these high-stakes
exams.60 Scholars are concerned that some schools may overly rely on
exclusionary discipline to push out disruptive, low performing students
to avoid having their low test scores count against their schools and to

Gap, in CLOSING THE OPPORTUNITY GAP: WHAT AMERICA MUST DO TO GIVE EVERY CHILD
AN EVEN CHANCE 77, 83 (Prudence L. Carter & Kevin G. Welner eds., 2013).
55 See Noguera, supra note 53, at 343.
56 See Jason A. Okonofua, Gregory M. Walton & Jennifer L. Eberhardt, A Vicious
Cycle: A Social-Psychological Account of Extreme Racial Disparities in School Discipline,
11 PERSP. ON PSYCH. SCI. 381, 385 (2016).
57 See Hirschfield, supra note 30, at 90; Noguera, supra note 53, at 342, 345; see also
Heise & Nance, “Defund the (School) Police”?, supra note 6, at 734.
58 See FED. ADVISORY COMM. ON JUV. JUST., ANNUAL REPORT 2010, at 10 (2010); Linda
Darling-Hammond, Race, Inequality, and Educational Accountability: The Irony of ‘No
Child Left Behind,’ 10 RACE, ETHNICITY, & EDUC., 245, 252-55 (2007); Rachel F. Moran,
Sorting and Reforming: High-Stakes Testing in the Public Schools, 34 AKRON L. REV. 107,
115 (2001); James E. Ryan, The Perverse Incentives of the No Child Left Behind Act, 79
N.Y.U. L. REV. 932, 969-70 (2004).
59 Every Student Succeeds Act, Pub. L. No. 114-95, 129 Stat. 1802 (2015) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C. (Supp. III 2015)) (reauthorizing and
amending the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (“ESEA”) that was initially
enacted in 1965); No Child Left Behind Act, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002);
see also Michael Heise, From No Child Left Behind to Every Student Succeeds: Back to a
Future for Education Federalism, 117 COLUM L. REV. 1859, 1872-73 (2017); Nance,
Student Surveillance, supra note 20, at 781-82.
60 Nance, Student Surveillance, supra note 20, at 781-82.
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conserve their limited resources for students they believe are more
likely to perform well.61
C. Increased Reliance on Law Enforcement Officers in Schools
A critical component to many schools’ “legalized” approach to school
discipline is the regular presence of law enforcement officers on school
grounds. Also called “school resource officers” or “SROs,” regular law
enforcement presence is now a common feature in thousands of schools
across the nation.62 While it is unclear exactly how many SROs exist at
the present time,63 survey data suggest that the number of SROs has
grown substantially over the last half century. For example, there were
less than one hundred police officers in schools in the late 1970s,64 but
by 2007, there were 20,000.65 More recent survey data estimate that
there are over 30,000 in schools today.66 In addition to the increase of
raw number of SROs in schools, the percentage of schools relying on
SROs is also increasing. In a prior study, we reported that the 2007–
2008 SSOCS weighted data showed that 21.1 percent of the sampled
schools indicated that an SRO/police officer was present at least one day
a week.67 The 2015–2016 SSOCS weighted data showed that this
percentage more than doubled to fifty percent.68

61 See Darling-Hammond, supra note 58, at 252-55; Moran, supra note 58, at 115;
Ryan, supra note 58, at 961; see also Heise & Nance, “Defund the (School) Police”?, supra
note 6, at 734.
62 The National Association of School Resource Officers states that school-based
policing “is the fastest-growing area of law enforcement.” About NASRO, NAT’L ASS’N
SCH. RES. OFFICERS, https://www.nasro.org/main/about-nasro/ (last visited Jan. 11,
2021) [https://perma.cc/4X5H-RV52].
63 See
Frequently Asked Questions, NAT’L ASS’N SCH. RES. OFFICERS,
https://www.nasro.org/faq/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2021) [https://perma.cc/DJ2V-NVF7].
64 Kevin P. Brady, Sharon Balmer & Deinya Phenix, School-Police Partnership
Effectiveness in Urban Schools: An Analysis of New York City’s Impact Schools Initiative,
39 EDUC. & URB. SOC’Y 455, 457 (2007); Paul J. Hirschfield & Katarzyna Celinska,
Beyond Fear: Sociological Perspectives on the Criminalization of School Discipline, 5 SOCIO.
COMPASS 1, 1 (2011).
65 NATHAN JAMES & GAIL MCCALLION, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43126, SCHOOL RESOURCE
OFFICERS: LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS IN SCHOOLS 20 (2013), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/
misc/R43126.pdf [http://perma.cc/5BJX-M43Z].
66 See LUCINDA GRAY, LAURIE LEWIS & JOHN RALPH, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., PUBLIC
SCHOOL SAFETY AND DISCIPLINE: 2013–14, at 11 (2015), https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2015/
2015051.pdf [https://perma.cc/6NVS-SX5Q] (estimating that there could be 30,000
SROs in the U.S.).
67 Heise & Nance, “Defund the (School) Police”?, supra note 6, at 736.
68 Id.
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Less clear, however, is whether these increasing trends will continue.
On the one hand, following the school shooting in Parkland, Florida in
2018, both the Florida and the Kentucky State Legislatures enacted
statutes mandating that every school in their states have at least one
SRO.69 But recent protests against police departments after the killing
of George Floyd70 has caused some school districts to rethink their
school resource officer programs and withdraw their partnership with
local police departments.71 For example, Los Angeles Unified School
District has significantly cut its school police budget, and school
districts in Minneapolis, Minnesota, Portland, Oregon, Denver,
Colorado, San Francisco, California, and Oakland, California have
ended contracts with police departments.72
Scholars theorize that the dramatic expansion of SRO programs
nationwide has been a response to highly publicized incidents of school
violence of the last two decades and the general “tough on crime”
mindset exhibited by many policymakers and authorities.73 It is also
likely that abundant federal and state dollars to support SRO programs
have fueled this expansion.74 Following the tragic shootings in
Columbine High School, the U.S. Department of Justice’s Office of
69 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1006.12 (2021) (“[E]ach district school board and school
district superintendent shall partner with law enforcement agencies or security agencies
to establish or assign one or more safe-school officers at each school facility within the
district.”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 158.4414 (2021) (“Local boards of education, school
district superintendents, and local and state law enforcement agencies shall cooperate
to assign one (1) or more certified school resource officers to each school within a
school district as funds and qualified personnel become available.”).
70 See Derrick Bryson Taylor, George Floyd Protests: A Timeline, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28,
2021), https://www.nytimes.com/article/george-floyd-protests-timeline.html [https://perma.
cc/Q3AX-QEZ6].
71 See Do Police Officers in Schools Help or Hinder Teachers?, supra note 3.
72 Id. But other large school districts, such as those in Chicago and New York City,
have rejected calls to diminish their SRO programs. Id.
73 See Ben Brown, Evaluations of School Policing Programs in the USA, in THE
PALGRAVE INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF SCHOOL DISCIPLINE, SURVEILLANCE, AND SOCIAL
CONTROL 327, 327 (Jo Deakin, Aaron Kupchik & Emmeline Taylor eds., 2018); F. CHRIS
CURRAN, BENJAMIN W. FISHER, SAMANTHA L. VIANO & AARON KUPCHIK, UNDERSTANDING
SCHOOL SAFETY AND THE USE OF SCHOOL RESOURCE OFFICERS IN UNDERSTUDIED SETTINGS
16-17 (2020), https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/254621.pdf [https://perma.cc/
8GFT-UHRE]; Denise C. Gottfredson, Scott Crosse, Zhiqun Tang, Erin L. Bauer,
Michele A. Harmon, Carol A. Hagen & Angela D. Greene, Effects of School Resource
Officers on School Crime and Responses to School Crime, 19 CRIM. & PUB. POL’Y 905, 90608 (2020); Josh Gupta-Kagan, Reevaluating School Searches Following School-to-Prison
Pipeline Reforms, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 2013, 2015 (2019) [hereinafter Reevaluating];
Theriot, supra note 11, at 280.
74 See Gottfredson et al., supra note 73, at 908.
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Community Policing Services began the “COPS in Schools” program,
providing grants to schools amounting to almost a billion dollars to hire
almost eight thousand SROs throughout the nation.75 Federal funding
from the U.S. Department of Justice, Education, and Health and Human
Services provided additional financial support to hire SROs.76
Furthermore, several state legislatures have also provided funding for
schools to develop or expand their SRO programs.77 Importantly,
policymakers and school officials have expanded SRO programs despite
a paucity of evidence supporting their effectiveness in decreasing school
crime, preventing violence, and promoting school safety.78
While the precise roles and responsibilities of SROs vary considerably
from school to school,79 unsurprisingly many school officials routinely
rely on SROs to carry out law enforcement activities in schools, such as
investigating complaints, monitoring students while patrolling school

75 See MARIEKE BROCK, NORMA KRIGER & RAMÓN MIRÓ, SCHOOL SAFETY POLICIES AND
PROGRAMS ADMINISTERED BY THE U.S. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: 1990–2016, at 78-79, 81
(2018), https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/251517.pdf [https://perma.cc/PNN3FQ8X].
76 U.S. Dep’t of Educ., U.S. Department of Education Awards More Than $32.8 Million
to Promote Safe Schools, Healthy Students (July 10, 2009), https://www2.ed.gov/
news/pressreleases/2009/07/07102009.html [https://perma.cc/Z86M-DVP2].
77 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 41-15B-2.2 (2021) (allocating funding for “[s]afety plans
involving the use of metal detectors, other security devices, uniforms, school safety
resource officers, or other personnel employed to provide a safe school environment”);
24 PA. CONS. STAT. § 13-1302-A (2021) (authorizing grants to cover costs associated
with compensating school resource officers); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-4302 (2021)
(mandating that the “Tennessee school safety center . . . establish school safety grants
to assist LEAs in funding programs that [include] . . . school resource officers”).
78 See, e.g., JAMES & MCCALLION, supra note 65, at 10-11 (observing that the
“noticeably limited” available research “draws conflicting conclusions about whether
SRO programs are effective at reducing violence”); Gottfredson et al., supra note 73, at
909-12 (concluding that “studies still fall short of definitively demonstrating the effect
of placing SROs on school crime”); Na & Gottfredson, supra note 10, at 624-25
(reviewing the available research and concluding that “there is a dearth of knowledge
about the effectiveness of SRO programs”); see also Heise & Nance, “Defund the (School)
Police”?, supra note 6, at 737; Jason P. Nance, Rethinking Law Enforcement Officers in
Schools, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. ARGUENDO 151, 153-54 (2016).
79 See CURRAN ET AL., supra note 73, at 18-22; PETER FINN, MICHAEL SHIVELY, JACK
MCDEVITT, WILLIAM LASSITER & TOM RICH, COMPARISON OF PROGRAM ACTIVITIES AND
LESSONS LEARNED AMONG 19 SCHOOL RESOURCE OFFICER (SRO) PROGRAMS 14-18 (2005),
https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/209272.pdf [https://perma.cc/9WVA-232T];
AARON KUPCHIK, HOMEROOM SECURITY: SCHOOL DISCIPLINE IN AN AGE OF FEAR 82-95
(2010); LAWRENCE F. TRAVIS III & JULIE KIERNAN COON, THE ROLE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT
IN PUBLIC SCHOOL SAFETY: A NATIONAL SURVEY 37-39 (2005), https://www.ojp.gov/
pdffiles1/nij/grants/211676.pdf [https://perma.cc/YPR7-3XLA]; see also Brown, supra
note 73, at 329-30.
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grounds, maintaining an orderly environment, issuing citations, and
making arrests.80 Furthermore, it appears that SROs have the authority
to intervene in all, or almost all, disciplinary events that occur in
schools. Even in states that have not enacted “disturbing school
statutes,”81 state legislatures criminalize actions such as “disturbing the
peace,” “disorderly conduct,” and “assault.”82 As a result, the increased
presence of law enforcement officers in schools has clouded the roles
and responsibilities of those traditionally charged with disciplining
students for misbehavior, especially because an SRO can essentially
overrule any disciplinary decision a school official renders by deciding
to arrest a student for violating the law.83 This is one reason that several
states, government agencies, and public interest entities recommend
that schools and law enforcement agencies enter into memorandums of
understanding (“MOU”) to specify the precise roles and responsibilities
of SROs before they work in schools.84 However, the effectiveness of
MOUs remains unclear, and the empirical research suggests that many
school authorities either do not have an MOU or are unaware of the
specific provisions their MOUs contain.85 Scholars have consistently

80 See JAMES & MCCALLION, supra note 65, at 2; KUPCHIK, supra note 79, at 83-89;
Gupta-Kagan, Reevaluating, supra note 73, at 2039; Theriot, supra note 11, at 281.
81 See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
82 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 241 (2021) (criminalizing assault); FLA. STAT.
§ 877.03 (2021) (criminalizing acts that breach the peace and disorderly conduct); VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.2-415 (2021) (criminalizing disorderly conduct).
83 See Ben Brown, Understanding and Assessing School Police Officers: A Conceptual
and Methodological Comment, 34 J. CRIM. JUST. 591, 591 (2006); see also OFF. OF CMTY.
ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., U.S. DEP’T JUST., A GUIDE TO DEVELOPING, MAINTAINING, AND
SUCCEEDING WITH YOUR SCHOOL RESOURCE OFFICER PROGRAM 51 (2005),
https://popcenter.asu.edu/sites/default/files/Responses/school_police/PDFs/Finn_et_al
_2005.pdf [http://perma.cc/235W-UCTT] (providing an example of an SRO who “once
had to threaten to arrest a principal for interfering with a police officer in the
performance of his duty when the administrator was physically barring [the SRO] from
arresting a student”).
84 See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 26-102 (2021) (specifying that SROs should be
assigned to school districts by way of memorandums of understanding); JAMES &
MCCALLION, supra note 65, at 11 (endorsing memorandums of understanding); U.S.
DEP’T EDUC., GUIDING PRINCIPLES: A RESOURCE GUIDE FOR IMPROVING SCHOOL CLIMATE
AND DISCIPLINE 3 (2014), https://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/school-discipline/
guiding-principles.pdf [https://perma.cc/G5Y5-XYQJ] (“In cases where schools choose
to make use of school-based law enforcement officers . . . schools should provide clear
definitions of the officers’ roles and responsibilities on campus [and] document those
expectations in a written agreement or memorandum of understanding . . . .”).
85 See MICHAEL JACKSON, MELISSA DILIBERTI, JANA KEMP, STEVEN HUMMEL, CHRISTINA
COX, KOMBA GBONDO-TUGBAWA, DILLON SIMON & RACHEL HANSEN, 2015–16 SCHOOL
SURVEY ON CRIME AND SAFETY (SSOCS): PUBLIC-USE DATA FILE USER’S MANUAL, at D-34 to
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raised concerns over the blurred lines between “enforcing the law” and
“disciplining students for misbehaving,” observing that the increased
presence of law enforcement in schools has been a major step towards
criminalizing student misconduct and amplifying the school-to-prison
pipeline.86
In addition, legal scholars have observed the increased strain on
students’ constitutional rights from introducing regular law
enforcement presence in schools.87 While the U.S. Supreme Court has
maintained that students do not “shed their constitutional rights . . . at
the schoolhouse gate,”88 students unquestionably have diminished
constitutional rights while at school and a school’s SRO/police presence
contributes to this diminishment.89 In the Fourth Amendment context,
the Court has applied a lower standard to evaluate the legality of
searches conducted by school officials, holding that school officials do
not need to demonstrate probable cause or obtain a warrant before
searching a student.90 Rather, the legality of the search will depend on
“‘whether the . . . action was justified at its inception,’” and “whether
the search ‘was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which

D-37 (2018), https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED581663.pdf [https://perma.cc/C3KUXFQF].
86 See, e.g., Gupta-Kagan, The School-to-Prison Pipeline, supra note 33, at 111-16
(describing law enforcement involving in school discipline); Fedders, supra note 52, at
573-74 (describing how normal adolescent misbehavior becomes characterized as
criminal activity in the presence of a law enforcement officer at school); Joseph B. Ryan,
Antonis Katsiyannis, Jennifer M. Counts & Jill C. Shelnut, The Growing Concerns
Regarding School Resource Officers, 53 INTERVENTION IN SCH. & CLINIC 188, 188 (2018)
(describing the “blurring of lines between duties on administration and those of law
enforcement” at school); Kerrin C. Wolf, Assessing Students’ Civil Rights Claims Against
School Resource Officers, 38 PACE L. REV. 215, 222 (2018) (maintaining that SROs are a
“feature of a larger trend” towards “the ‘criminalization’ of American public school
students”); see also Heise & Nance, “Defund the (School) Police”?, supra note 6, at 732-33.
87 See Gupta-Kagan, Reevaluating, supra note 73, at 2015-18; Catherine Y. Kim,
Policing School Discipline, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 861, 861-65 (2012); Nance, Students, Police,
supra note 5, at 936-40; Michael Pinard, From the Classroom to the Courtroom:
Reassessing Fourth Amendment Standards in Public School Searches Involving Law
Enforcement Authorities, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 1067, 1067-70 (2003).
88 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
89 See Nance, School Surveillance, supra note 5, at 122-23; James E. Ryan, The
Supreme Court and Public Schools, 86 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1338-43 (2000) (arguing that
courts limit students’ free speech, right to privacy, and due process rights in schools
because in schools the government acts as an educator, and it would be impossible to
“fully protect[] students’ constitutional rights while simultaneously ensuring the
effective operation of public schools”).
90 See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340-41 (1985).
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justified the interference in the first place.’”91 The majority of lower
courts evaluating the constitutionality of searches conducted by SROs
have applied this lower standard, even though evidence obtained from
the search can be used for criminal prosecution purposes and even
though law enforcement officers would be subject to the higher
standard for searching youth outside of schools.92 Similarly, lower
courts also consistently hold that school administrators do not need to
provide Miranda warnings before interrogating a student,93 even when
SROs are present during in an interrogation.94
D. Empirical Studies Measuring SRO/Police Programs’ Effects on
Schools’ Referrals to Law Enforcement for Engaging in Misconduct
We are not aware of any empirical studies examining the relationship
between the regular presence of law enforcement officers in schools and
not reporting student disciplinary matters to law enforcement agencies.
However, many studies examine the influence of a school’s SRO/police
presence on the school’s probability of referring students to law
enforcement for engaging in certain wrongful acts. The most recent
study of which we are aware is our own. Specifically, we investigated
the relationships between the magnitude of SRO/police at school and a
school’s rate of reporting student wrongdoing to law enforcement by
exploiting data from the 2015–2016 SSOCS, supplemented by data from
state statute mandatory reporting requirements and data on school
district-level per pupil spending.95 We accounted for various schoollevel and student-focused variables and applied three distinct analytical
approaches to better isolate the independent influence of a school’s
91

Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)).
See, e.g., People v. Dilworth, 661 N.E.2d 310, 317 (Ill. 1996) (applying a
reasonableness standard to a search of a student at school); R.D.S. v. State, 245 S.W.3d
356, 367 (Tenn. 2008) (applying a reasonable suspicion standard); see also GuptaKagan, Reevaluating, supra note 73, at 2024-30; Kim, supra note 87, at 866.
93 See, e.g., S.E. v. Grant Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 544 F.3d 633, 640-41 (6th Cir. 2008)
(stating that a school official may detain a student “if there is a reasonable basis for
believing that the pupil has violated the law or a school rule”); C.S. v. Couch, 843 F.
Supp. 2d 894, 917-20 (N.D. Ind. 2011) (finding failure of a Miranda claim in a school
setting).
94 See, e.g., State v. J.T.D., 851 So. 2d 793, 797 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (arguing
for an exception to Miranda warnings for school officials); People v. Pankhurst, 848
N.E.2d 628, 633-34 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006) (analyzing Miranda issues in school settings);
In re Tateana R., 883 N.Y.S.2d 476, 477-78 (App. Div. 2009) (denying motion to
suppress remarks given under interrogation without Miranda warnings); see also Heise
& Nance, “Defund the (School) Police”?, supra note 6, at 739.
95 Heise & Nance, “Defund the (School) Police”?, supra note 6, at 743-44.
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SRO/police presence (and the magnitude of this presence) on a school’s
reporting rate.96 We concluded that “when it comes to either whether a
school reports any student disciplinary incidents to law enforcement
agencies or a school’s rate [per 100 students] of reporting, we find
consistent and robust evidence — and across virtually all of our models
— that a school’s SRO/police presence exerts upward influence on
schools’ inclination to repot and rate of reporting.”97
One of the authors of this article conducted a similar study on an
earlier SSOCS data set (2009–2010), although he relied on raw data,
pursued slightly different empirical methodologies, and did not include
data on school district-level per pupil spending.98 After controlling for
state statute mandatory reporting requirements, school-level variables,
and student-focused variables, Nance concluded that a “police officer’s
regular presence at a school is predictive of greater odds that school
officials refer students to law enforcement for committing various
offenses, including lower-level offenses.”99
Na and Gottfredson also examined the relationship between a regular
presence of law enforcement at school and reporting students to law
enforcement using the various SSOCS data sets (2003–2004, 2005–
2006, 2007–2008).100 Similar to prior studies, Na and Gottfredson also
found a positive correlation between the number of SROs having regular
contact with a school and the probability of reporting students to law
enforcement for engaging in various acts of wrongdoing.101
Other notable empirical studies have examined the relationship
between SRO programs and increased student involvement in the
criminal justice system, but these studies are distinct from the above
studies in that they measure arrests conducted by SROs or other law
enforcement rather than school referrals to law enforcement.
Nevertheless, their findings generally comport with the overall trends
from the above studies. For example, Owens found that police agencies
that received federal grants to hire more SROs were more likely to learn
about school-based crimes and arrest students for committing those
crimes.102 Theriot exploited a natural experiment by examining a school
district in the southeastern United States that provided SROs to schools
96

Id. at 743-51.
Id. at 762.
98 See Nance, Students, Police, supra note 5, at 958-75.
99 Id. at 983.
100 See Na & Gottfredson, supra note 10, at 626-27.
101 Id. at 635, 637.
102 Emily G. Owens, Testing the School-to-Prison Pipeline, 36 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS &
MGMT. 11, 31-32 (2017).
97
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inside the city’s limits but not outside.103 He observed that students in
schools with SROs were more likely to be arrested for lower-level
offenses than schools without SROs.104
E. Consequences of the Increased “Legalized” Approach to School
Discipline and Safety
Significant scholarly attention also has focused on the negative
consequences that can flow to students, their families, and our society
as a result of schools’ “legalized” approach to school discipline. The
primary concern is that schools’ legalized approach to school discipline
directly or indirectly leads to more individuals becoming involved in
the criminal justice system, either as students, when these students
reach adulthood, or both. Of course, referring students to law
enforcement agencies when they engage in criminal activity directly and
immediately involves students in the criminal justice system.105 But
suspension and expulsion often can lead to increased student
involvement in the criminal justice system as well. Suspended and
expelled students are frequently left home unsupervised and become
involved in criminal activity outside of school.106 Empirical studies
document that each suspension and expulsion increases the odds that
students will have more contact with the juvenile justice system, even
after accounting for school campus and individual characteristics.107
Furthermore, studies elucidate the strong connection between
exclusionary discipline practices and adult involvement in the criminal
justice system.108 Studies also show a strong link between exclusionary
103

Theriot, supra note 11, at 282.
Id. at 284-85.
105 It is important to remember that “criminal activity” can be construed as broadly
as “interfer[ing] with the education process of any public . . . school.” N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 30-20-13(D) (2021); see also ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-21-606 (2021); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 877.13 (2021).
106 See Am. Acad. Pediatrics, Out-of-School Suspension and Expulsion, 112 PEDIATRICS
1206, 1207 (2003).
107 See TONY FABELO, MICHAEL D. THOMPSON, MARTHA PLOTKIN, DOTTIE CARMICHAEL,
MINER P. MARCHBANKS III & ERIC A. BOOTH, BREAKING SCHOOLS’ RULES: A STATEWIDE
STUDY OF HOW SCHOOL DISCIPLINE RELATES TO STUDENTS’ SUCCESS AND JUVENILE JUSTICE
INVOLVEMENT 26, 31-32, 70 (2011), https://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/system/files/
Breaking_School_Rules.pdf [https://perma.cc/6JMZ-8NE5].
108 See Tracey L. Shollenberger, Racial Disparities in School Suspension and Subsequent
Outcomes: Evidence from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, in CLOSING THE
SCHOOL DISCIPLINE GAP: EQUITABLE REMEDIES FOR EXCESSIVE EXCLUSION 31, 36-40 (Daniel
J. Losen ed., 2015); Thomas Mowen & John Brent, School Discipline as a Turning Point:
The Cumulative Effect of Suspension on Arrest, 53 J. RSCH. CRIME & DELINQ. 628, 642-43
104
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discipline practices and failing to graduate from high school,109 and
failing to graduate is another indirect pathway to increased involvement
in the justice system.110 When students are suspended and expelled,
they miss class time, cannot build positive relationships with other
members of the school community, fail to receive support, get behind,
become disengaged, are stigmatized, and drop out.111
Involvement in the criminal justice system leads to a host of negative
outcomes for youth and adults. Incarcerating youth, the most extreme
result, decreases opportunities for employment and housing.112
Incarcerated youth often cannot access robust educational services,
complete their education, or develop skills necessary to secure adequate
employment or pursue higher education opportunities upon release.113
Youth who have been incarcerated are more likely to have mental health

(2016); Kerrin C. Wolf & Aaron Kupchik, School Suspensions and Adverse Experiences
in Adulthood, 34 JUST. Q. 407, 421-22 (2017).
109 See, e.g., FABELO ET AL., supra note 107, at 54-59 (finding that students who were
suspended or expelled were more likely to drop out of school); Robert Balfanz, Vaughan
Byrnes & Joanna Fox, Sent Home and Put-Off Track: The Antecedents,
Disproportionalities, and Consequences of Being Suspended in the Ninth Grade, 5 J. APPLIED
RSCH. ON CHILD. 1, 7-9 (2014) (“With each increasing suspension in 9th grade, the odds
of dropping out of high school increase while conversely the chances of graduating
decrease as do the chances of enrolling and persisting in post-secondary schooling.”).
110 See CLIVE R. BELFIELD, HENRY M. LEVIN & RACHEL ROSEN, THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF
OPPORTUNITY YOUTH 20 (2012), http://youthtoday.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/13/
hotdocs/econ_value_opportunity_youth.pdf [https://perma.cc/8323-XKCK]; NAT’L
CTR. JUV. JUST., JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 2014 NATIONAL REPORT 15 (Melissa
Sickmund & Charles Puzzanchera eds., 2014), https://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/nr2014/
downloads/NR2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/65VL-LWEX].
111 See Erik J. Girvan, Towards a Problem-Solving Approach to Addressing Racial
Disparities in School Discipline under Anti-Discrimination Law, 50 U. MEMPHIS L. REV.
995, 1003-06 (2020); Richard O. Welsh & Shafiqua Little, Caste and Control in Schools:
A Systematic Review of the Pathways, Rates, and Correlates of Exclusion Due to School
Discipline, 94 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVS. REV. 315, 319-20 (2018); see also Heise & Nance,
“Defund the (School) Police”?, supra note 6, at 727.
112 See BARRY HOLMAN & JASON ZIEDENBERG, THE DANGERS OF DETENTION: THE
IMPACT OF INCARCERATING YOUTH IN DETENTION AND OTHER SECURE FACILITIES 9
(2006), https://njdc.info/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/PJDC-Dangers-of-Detention.pdf [https://perma.cc/2WWN-GQ5Y]; RIYA SHAH & JEAN STROUT, FUTURE INTERRUPTED:
THE COLLATERAL DAMAGE CAUSED BY PROLIFERATION OF JUVENILE RECORDS 10-11 (2016),
https://juvenilerecords.jlc.org/juvenilerecords/documents/publications/future-interrupted
.pdf [https://perma.cc/3TSK-VZCG].
113 See HOLMAN & ZIEDENBERG, supra note 112, at 2; Peter E. Leone, Doing Things
Differently: Education as a Vehicle for Youth Transformation and Finland as a Model for
Juvenile Justice Reform, in A NEW JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM: TOTAL REFORM FOR A BROKEN
SYSTEM 86, 91 (Nancy E. Dowd ed., 2015).
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conditions114 develop violent attitudes and behaviors,115 and become
involved in the criminal justice system as an adult.116
A student arrest, even when the arrest does not lead to incarceration,
is also associated with undesirable outcomes. Arrested students can
suffer from emotional trauma, stigma, a failure to graduate from high
school, and expulsion.117 Empirical studies also link an arrest alone to
such troubling outcomes as increased poverty, unemployment, poor
health, and increased involvement in the criminal justice system later
in life.118
F.

Exercising Discretion to Not Report Wrongdoing to Law Enforcement
and Reputational Effects

Very little scholarly attention has been devoted to the subject of
school authorities exercising discretion to not report wrongdoing to law
enforcement authorities. Yet, our data indicate that this is a far more
common occurrence in public schools than reporting students to law
enforcement.119 As an initial matter, we are careful to use the term
114 See Christopher B. Forrest, Ellen Tambor, Anne W. Riley, Margaret E. Ensminger
& Barbara Starfield, The Health Profile of Incarcerated Male Youths, 105 PEDIATRICS 286,
288-89 (2000); Javid H. Kashani, George W. Manning, Donald H. McKnew, Leon
Cytryn, John F. Simonds & Phil C. Wooderson, Depression Among Incarcerated
Delinquents, 3 PSYCHIATRY RSCH. 185, 190 (1980).
115 See Anne M. Hobbs, Timbre Lee Wulf-Ludden & Jenna Strawhun, Assessing Youth
Early in the Juvenile Justice System, 3 OJJPD J. JUV. JUST. 80, 81 (2013); cf. Mark J. Van
Ryzin & Thomas J. Dishion, From Antisocial Behavior to Violence: A Model for the
Amplifying Role of Coercive Joining in Adolescent Friendships, 54 J. CHILD PSYCH. &
PSYCHIATRY 661, 661 (2013) (explaining that coercive friendships during adolescent
years predict violent behavior in adulthood).
116 See ANTHONY PETROSINO, CAROLYN TURPIN-PETROSINO & SARAH GUCKENBURG,
FORMAL SYSTEM PROCESSING OF JUVENILES: EFFECTS ON DELINQUENCY 25-36 (2010); Brent
B. Benda & Connie L. Tollett, A Study of Recidivism of Serious and Persistent Offenders
Among Adolescents, 27 J. CRIM. JUST. 111, 120 (1999); see also Heise & Nance, “Defund
the (School) Police”?, supra note 6, at 727.
117 See ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, EDUCATION ON LOCKDOWN: THE SCHOOLHOUSE TO
JAILHOUSE TRACK 12 (2005); Gary Sweeten, Who Will Graduate? Disruption of High
School Education by Arrest and Court Involvement, 23 JUST. Q. 462, 463, 477-79 (2006);
Theriot, supra note 11, at 280-81; see also Paul Hirschfield, Another Way Out: The Impact
of Juvenile Arrests on High School Dropout, 82 SOCIO. EDUC. 368, 384-87 (2009).
118 See HENRY LEVIN, CLIVE BELFIELD, PETER A. MUENNIG & CECILIA ROUSE, THE COSTS
AND BENEFITS OF AN EXCELLENT EDUCATION FOR ALL OF AMERICA’S CHILDREN 14-15 (2007);
see also Heise & Nance, “Defund the (School) Police”?, supra note 6, at 727-28. See
generally JOHN M. BRIDGELAND, JOHN J. DILULIO, JR., & KAREN BURKE MORISON, THE SILENT
EPIDEMIC: PERSPECTIVES OF HIGH SCHOOL DROPOUTS 2 (2006) (presenting consequences
of dropping out of high school).
119 See infra Part II.A.1.
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“discretion” because many states have enacted statutes mandating that
school authorities report certain crimes to law enforcement
authorities.120 Nevertheless, empirical evidence suggests that state
reporting statutes overall do not influence school authorities to report
criminal actions to law enforcement.121
For example, in his 2016 study analyzing SSOCS data, Nance found
that reporting statutes were “insignificant predictors of the odds of
referring students to enforcement for robbery without a weapon and
vandalism, although they are weakly associated in a positive fashion
with the odds of referring students for theft.”122 He also found,
curiously, that reporting statutes were negatively associated with drugand alcohol-related offenses.123 He hypothesized that statutes are not a
driving force behind referrals to law enforcement because they do not
appear to be enforced and, possibly, most schools are unaware of
them.124 Similarly, in a prior study, we found that state-level mandatory
reporting requirements did not influence the reporting of violent
incidents to law enforcement, and they corresponded with a reduction
in the odds of reporting for non-violence incidents.125 Collectively,
these findings suggest that state reporting statutes do not influence
school officials to report students to law enforcement authorities when
students engage in criminal activities. Rather, many schools and
districts have their own policies, practices, and norms governing when
school officials will and will not report students to law enforcement for
criminal activity.126
There are obvious reasons why school authorities choose to not
report student misconduct to law enforcement agencies. For example,
some officials want to avoid the negative attention these reports may
bring to their schools. These school officials do not want parents and
the larger community to perceive that their schools are dangerous and
disorderly, which may cause parents to enroll their children

120 See supra notes 32–33 and accompanying text; see also Heise & Nance, “Defund the
(School) Police”?, supra note 6, at 743; Nance, Students, Police, supra note 5, at 934-36.
121 See Heise & Nance, “Defund the (School) Police”?, supra note 6, at 758-63; Nance,
Students, Police, supra note 5, at 973.
122 Nance, Students, Police, supra note 5, at 973.
123 Id.
124 Id. Indeed, from personal experience, even as trained lawyers and legal
researchers, it was challenging for us to identify all the statutes that mandate schools to
report various criminal actions to law enforcement authorities.
125 Heise & Nance, “Defund the (School) Police”?, supra note 6, at 758-63.
126 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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elsewhere.127 Relatedly, schools may not have adequate resources to
invest in safety measures to satisfy the community if interested parties
were to become aware of school criminal activity.128 School
administrators also do not want to be viewed as ineffective by their
superiors and lose their jobs.129 In addition, it is possible that some
school officials may understand the significant negative consequences
that flow to students and their families when students become involved
in the criminal justice system. In short, school officials may see very
little upside and reward to reporting and tremendous downside,
especially if there are no consequences for failing to report.130
Furthermore, school administrators often have other means at their
disposal to address student misconduct. For example, it is common for
administrators to suspend, expel, or transfer students to alternative
schools for engaging in criminal activity.131 Fewer schools rely on less
punitive measures to address misbehavior, but these alternative
measures show promise. Restorative justice and tiered behavioral
127 For example, Rebecca Dahl, a retired school administrator, explained that “if you
show you’ve got all these incidents, parents won’t put their children in the school because
they think it’s not safe. That’s really what happens.” Scott Travis, Megan O’Matz & John
Maines, Broward School District Failing to Report Many Campus Crimes to State as Required,
SUN SENTINEL (June 8, 2018, 11:10 PM), https://www.sun-sentinel.com/local/broward/
parkland/florida-school-shooting/fl-florida-school-shooting-discipline-reporting-20180607story.html [https://perma.cc/RN78-S2B4]. Mary Fitzgerald, a retired educator, commented,
“A lot of principals are afraid . . . You don’t report theft because reporting it makes your
school look dangerous.” Megan O’Matz & Scott Travis, Schools’ Culture of Tolerance Lets
Students Like Nikolas Cruz Slide, SUN SENTINEL (May 12, 2018, 6:35 PM), https://www.sunsentinel.com/local/broward/parkland/florida-school-shooting/fl-florida-school-shootingdiscipline-20180510-story.html [https://perma.cc/S5N3-JVBZ]. School Superintendent
Robert Runcie conceded that school officials fail to accurately report criminal activity
because “they felt it would weigh negatively on how they are perceived.” Scott Travis & John
Maines, Florida Schools Cover Up Crimes: Rapes, Guns and More, SUN SENTINEL (Dec. 7, 2018,
6:00 PM), https://www.sun-sentinel.com/local/broward/parkland/florida-school-shooting/flne-florida-school-crime-reporting-20181127-story.html [https://perma.cc/W2YB-TWBS].
Kendrick Meek, former U.S. congressman and committee member studying school safety
issues following the shootings at Columbine High School, observed that “[j]ust like many
cities under-report hate crimes because they don’t want to be the city with the most, schools
and school boards don’t want their schools to be seen as unsafe.” Id.
128 See School Crime Reporting and Underreporting, NAT’L SCH. SAFETY & SEC. SERVS.,
https://www.schoolsecurity.org/trends/school-crime-reporting-and-underreporting/
(last visited May 23, 2021) [https://perma.cc/7L6Z-9UA5].
129 See Travis et al., supra note 127 (reporting that if school crime reports are too
high supervisors of school principals become displeased, and principals “fear for their
jobs”); School Crime Reporting and Underreporting, supra note 128.
130 See Travis et al., supra note 127; Travis & Maines, supra note 127; School Crime
Reporting and Underreporting, supra note 128.
131 See Nance, Dismantling the School-to-Prison Pipeline, supra note 1, at 316-17.
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support initiatives are two evidence-based measures that, if
implemented effectively, can promote school safety without overly
relying on punitive measures that can do more harm than good.132
However, these alternative initiatives require sustained resources, time,
attention, and energy to work effectively, which may explain why they
are less commonly used.133
G. Racial Inequalities in Disciplinary Outcomes
A troubling trend that emerges from the literature is that not all
student demographic groups experience negative disciplinary outcomes
in a proportional manner. Scholars repeatedly have found that racial
disparities relating to suspensions, expulsions, and other adverse
disciplinary decisions persist even after controlling for student
misbehavior, academic achievement, neighborhood context, district
and school characteristics, and poverty.134 But close scrutiny of the
empirical studies provides more insight regarding the conditions under
which racial disparities are most likely to occur.
For example, Girvan and his colleagues examined the disciplinary
records of over 1.15 million students from over 1,800 schools across the
nation to understand whether racial disparities were greater in office
discipline referrals (“ODRs”) that reflected a subjectively defined
judgment (e.g., defiance, disrespect, disruption) or an objectively
defined judgment (e.g., truancy, fighting).135 They concluded that the
results were “highly consistent”; specifically, that student race
explained substantially more variance in the subjectively defined ODRs
than in the objective ODRs, even after controlling for various school
characteristics such as enrollment and student poverty.136

132

For an extended discussion of these measures, see id. at 352-62.
See id.
134 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-258, K-12 EDUCATION: DISCIPLINE
DISPARITIES FOR BLACK STUDENTS, BOYS, AND STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES 12-14 (2018);
Yolanda Anyon, Jeffrey M. Jenson, Inna Altschul, Jordan Farrar, Jeanette McQueen,
Eldridge Greer, Barbara Downing & John Simmons, The Persistent Effect of Race and the
Promise of Alternatives to Suspension in School Discipline Outcomes, 44 CHILD. & YOUTH
SERVS. REV. 379, 380 (2014); Girvan, supra note 111, at 10-12; Russell J. Skiba, Robert
H. Homer, Choong-Geun Chung, M. Karega Rausch, Seth L. May & Tary Tobin, Race
Is Not Neutral: A National Investigation of African American and Latino Disproportionality
in School Discipline, 40 SCH. PSYCH. REV. 85, 95-101 (2011).
135 Erik J. Girvan, Cody Gion, Kent McIntosh & Keith Smolkowski, The Relative
Contribution of Subjective Office Referrals to Racial Disproportionality in School Discipline,
32 SCH. PSYCH. Q. 392, 394-96, 400-01 (2016).
136 Id. at 400.
133
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Huang and Cornell examined survey data from more than 38,000
students in 236 schools in Virginia to investigate the reasons underlying
racial disparities relating to out-of-school suspensions.137 They
discovered that Black and white student suspension rates were similar
for fighting, white student suspension rates were higher for alcohol,
tobacco, and drug-related offenses, and that Black student suspension
rates were higher for verbal misbehavior, including arguing,
threatening, or using inappropriate language.138 They concluded that
their findings supported the view that while there “may be cultural and
linguistic differences in social behaviors that lead school authorities to
react differently to Black students who express their feelings in a
manner they do not find acceptable,” these findings were “consistent
with the view that Black students are suspended disproportionately
because of more subjective judgments by school authorities.”139
Fabelo and his colleagues conducted a longitudinal study involving
over 900,000 students in Texas.140 They carefully examined racial
disparities relating to disciplinary actions for two categories of offenses:
(1) felony offenses requiring mandatory removal from school under
state law (e.g., possession of weapons, aggravated assault, sexual
assault, possession of drugs or alcohol); and (2) offenses where school
officials had discretion to remove students from school.141 After
controlling for many factors such as student background characteristics,
student academic performance, and school characteristics, they found
that “African-American students had about a 31 percent higher
likelihood of a discretionary school disciplinary action, compared to the
rate for otherwise identical white students.”142 In addition, “AfricanAmerican students had about a 23 percent lower likelihood of facing a
mandatory school disciplinary action . . . compared to otherwise
identical white students.”143
Skiba and his colleagues examined the disciplinary records of over
11,000 students in nineteen middle schools in a large, urban
midwestern public school district to explore factors that explained

137 Francis L. Huang & Dewey G. Cornell, Student Attitudes and Behaviors as
Explanations for the Black-White Suspension Gap, 73 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVS. REV. 298,
300-01 (2017).
138 Id. at 305.
139 Id.
140 FABELO ET AL., supra note 107, at 26, 31-32, 70.
141 Id. at 95-98.
142 Id. at 45.
143 Id.
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racial disparities relating to school punishment.144 They discovered that
white students were more likely to be referred to administrative office
for punishment for more “objective” offenses, such as smoking, leaving
without permission, obscene language, and vandalism.145 In contrast,
Black students were more likely to be referred to the office for offenses
that “would seem to require a good deal more subjective judgment on
the part of the referring agent,” such as disrespect, excessive noise,
threat, and loitering.146
Empirical studies examining racial disparities in referrals to law
enforcement and school-based arrests also are telling. The U.S.
Department of Education Office for Civil Rights’ Civil Rights Data
Collection show racial disparities at a national level for both referrals to
law enforcement and school-based arrests,147 and other analyses of this
data show disparities at the state level.148 However, very little robust
empirical analysis has been conducted at the school level, and available
studies show mixed results.
For example, Ramey examined the relationship between school- and
district-level racial compositions and rates of suspensions, expulsions,
referrals to law enforcement, and school-based arrests using data from
the 2009–2010 U.S. Department of Education Civil Rights Data
Collection and the 2009–2010 National Center for Education Statistics
Common Core of Data.149 Ramey found that schools (but not districts)
144 Russell J. Skiba, Robert S. Michael, Abra Carroll Nardo & Reece L. Peterson, The
Color of Discipline: Sources of Racial and Gender Disproportionality in School Punishment,
34 URB. REV. 317, 323 (2002).
145 Id. at 332, 334.
146 Id. at 334.
147 See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. OFF. FOR C.R., CIVIL RIGHTS DATA COLLECTION DATA
SNAPSHOT: SCHOOL DISCIPLINE 1, 6 (2014) https://ocrdata.ed.gov/assets/downloads/
CRDC-School-Discipline-Snapshot.pdf [https://perma.cc/PD3P-RUL5] (stating that
“[w]hile black students represent 16% of student enrollment, they represent 27% of
students referred to law enforcement and 31% of students subjected to a school-related
arrest”); see also Emily M. Homer & Benjamin W. Fisher, Police in Schools and Student
Arrest Rates Across the United States: Examining Differences by Race, Ethnicity, and
Gender, 19 J. SCH. VIOLENCE 192, 196-99 (2020) (analyzing data from the 2013–2014
Civil Rights Data Collection and concluding that “Black students’ arrest rates were
higher by 1.22 students per 1,000,” and “Hispanic students’ arrest rates were higher by
0.55 students per 1,000” in schools with police).
148 See, e.g., Evie Blad & Alex Harwin, Black Students More Likely to Be Arrested at
School, EDUC. WK. (Jan. 24, 2017), https://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2017/01/25/
black-students-more-likely-to-be-arrested.html?r=1131109146 [https://perma.cc/3GLZ92MG] (“In 43 states and the District of Columbia, black students are arrested at school
at disproportionately high levels . . . .”).
149 David M. Ramey, The Social Structure of Criminalized and Medicalized School
Discipline, 88 SOCIO. EDUC. 181, 187 (2015).
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serving higher concentrations of Black students had higher referral rates
to law enforcement and arrest rates.150 However, racial disparities were
more pronounced for rates of suspensions and expulsions.151 Ramey’s
findings held after controlling for school- and district-level
characteristics, but he did not control for the regular presence of law
enforcement officers at school or for state statutes mandating reporting
to law enforcement.152
In a rare ethnographic study, Curran and his colleagues observed
personally how SRO programs operated in two mid-sized suburban
school districts located in the South, including the frequency of student
arrests.153 All of the approximately fifty schools they studied
experienced the regular presence of an SRO.154 The two school districts
primarily served affluent white students, but the individual schools’
characteristics varied considerably with respect to student race, student
poverty, and the urbanicity of the school.155 The researchers observed
“very little variation in the practices of SROs across these schools” and
that “SROs tended to view the risks of threats and their approaches to
school discipline similarly, regardless of the racial composition of the
school.”156
In an earlier study using the 2009–2010 SSOCS dataset, one of the
authors of this Article examined the relationship between the
percentage of minority students a school serves and student referrals to
law enforcement for various offenses.157 After controlling for state
statute mandatory reporting requirements, school-level variables,
student-focused variables, and whether the school had regular contact
with law enforcement, Nance found that “the percentage of minority
students a school serves is generally insignificant with respect to all of
the offenses except two, where it is a negative predictor (robbery
without a weapon and alcohol offenses).”158
The most recent study in this area of which we are aware is our own.
Using the 2015–2016 SSOCS dataset supplemented by data from state
150

Id. at 189, 192.
See id.
152 See id. at 188.
153 CURRAN ET AL., supra note 73, at 3-4, 7, 31, 32.
154 Id. at 7.
155 Id.
156 Id. at 33.
157 See Nance, Students, Police, supra note 5, at 969, 973.
158 Id. at 973 (emphasis added). Nance also emphasized that the SSOCS data did not
allow him to examine “the race or ethnicity of the individual students who were actually
referred to law enforcement.” Id.
151
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statute mandatory reporting requirements and data on school districtlevel per pupil spending, we investigated the effect of the school’s
percentage of all nonwhite (including Black) and Black students on a
school’s rate of referrals to law enforcement.159 We also accounted for
various school-level and student-focused variables, as well as for state
statutes mandating referral to law enforcement and the regular presence
of law enforcement in the school.160 We observed that a school’s
percentage of Black students and nonwhite students did not
“correspond with any systematic increase in that school’s likelihood of
reporting student incidents to law enforcement agencies.”161
H. Discretionary Decision-making and Implicit Racial Bias
Generally, a consistent theme emerges from the above empirical
studies measuring racial disparities in school disciplinary outcomes:
racial disparities tend to occur and be more pronounced for offenses
requiring subjectively defined judgment, such as disrespect, defiance,
or disruption, than for offenses that require an objectively defined
judgment, such as possession of drugs or alcohol, fighting, or
truancy.162 And because most referrals to law enforcement in the school
disciplinary context are for objectively-defined offenses (such as
possession of weapons or drugs), it logically follows that generally we
should expect to observe fewer racial disparities in rates of referral to
law enforcement agencies.
But why do we tend to observe more racial disparities for offenses
requiring subjectively defined judgment? As Girvan concludes, “racial
disparities are higher for violations of subjectively defined behavior
expectations” because they “are more likely to be influenced by
biases.”163 Objectively defined offenses, on the other hand, are “more
robust to the effects of racial stereotypes and attitudes.”164 While
educators’ racial biases may not be the only cause of these racial
disparities,165 many scholars who study racial disparities in discipline
159

See Heise & Nance, “Defund the (School) Police”?, supra note 6, at 741-44, 750-51.
See id. at 745-51.
161 Id. at 757.
162 See Girvan et al., supra note 135, at 394-96, 401.
163 Girvan, supra note 111, at 1011.
164 Id.
165 See, e.g., Girvan, supra note 111, at 1006-07, 1009-10 (proposing student
behaviors and administrative discipline policies as additional potential causes of these
racial disparities); Girvan et al., supra note 135, at 393 (observing that that the reasons
for racial disparities relating to discipline are multifaceted); Jason A. Okonofua et al.,
supra note 56, at 382-85 (describing multiple forces driving racial disparities in school
160
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outcomes conclude that educators’ racial biases likely contribute to
these disparities.166
Implicit racial bias theory posits that individuals are prone to making
subconscious associations about racial groups unintentionally,
automatically, involuntarily, and effortlessly.167 The driving forces
behind implicit racial bias are unconscious attitudes and stereotypes.168
Scholars theorize that individuals develop unconscious stereotypes and
attitudes from repeated exposure to connections between racial groups
and various concepts and traits.169 Because individuals living in the
United States have been repeatedly exposed to information associating
African-Americans with violence, danger, criminality, and aggression,
many unconsciously associate African-Americans with these negative
traits.170 Importantly, empirical research suggests that individuals can
hold unconscious attitudes and stereotypes that are inconsistent with
beliefs, attitudes, and principles they consciously endorse and can
influence behavior, judgments, and decision-making in manners of
discipline); Rocque & Paternoster, supra note 17, at 635-39 (describing multiple forces
driving racial disparities in school discipline); Russell J. Skiba, Choon-Geun Chung,
Megan Trachok, Timberly L. Baker, Adam Sheya & Robin L. Hughes, Parsing
Disciplinary Disproportionality: Contributions of Infraction, Student, and School
Characteristics to Out-of-School Suspension and Expulsion, 51 AM. EDUC. RSCH. J. 640,
644-47 (2014) (discussing various student characteristics that make students more
likely to be suspended).
166 See Girvan, supra note 111, at 1007-10; Okonofua et al., supra note 56, at 38385; Jason A. Okonofua & Jennifer L. Eberhardt, Two Strikes: Race and the Disciplining
of Young Students, 26 PSYCH. SCI. 617, 618, 622-23 (2015). See generally Kent McIntosh,
Erik J. Girvan, Robert H. Horner & Keith Smolkowski, Education not Incarceration: A
Conceptual Model for Reducing Racial and Ethnic Disproportionality in School Discipline,
5 J. APPLIED RSCH. ON CHILD.: INFORMING POL’Y FOR CHILD. AT RISK 1, 4-7 (2014) (urging
that racial bias be considered multidimensionally).
167 See Sandra Graham & Brian S. Lowery, Priming Unconscious Racial Stereotypes
About Adolescent Offenders, 28 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 483, 485 (2004). For an extended
discussion of implicit racial bias, see Nance, Student Surveillance, supra note 20, at 816-31.
168 See Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific
Foundations, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 945, 948 (2006). An attitude is a favorable or unfavorable
disposition towards concepts such as social groups. Id.; see also Jerry Kang et al., supra
note 24, at 1128. A stereotype is a “socially shared set of beliefs about traits that are
characteristic of members of a social category.” Anthony G. Greenwald & Mahzarin R.
Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition: Attitudes, Self-Esteem, and Stereotypes, 102 PSYCH. REV.
4, 14 (1995).
169 See L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, Implicit Racial Bias in the Public
Defender Triage, 122 YALE L.J. 2626, 2630 (2013).
170 See Jennifer L. Eberhardt, Phillip Atiba Goff, Valerie J. Purdie & Paul G. Davies,
Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Processing, 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 876,
876 (2004); L. Song Richardson, Police Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 87 IND. L.J.
1143, 1147 (2012).
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which individuals are unaware or not able to control.171 Implicit biases
tend to manifest themselves most acutely in particular situations, such
as when individuals “have wide discretion in making quick decisions
with little accountability,”172 when situations are unclear and difficult
to understand, and when cognitive resources are strained or limited.173
Social scientists have documented the effect of implicit bias in
decision-making in various contexts.174 Not only has evidence of such
bias against minorities emerged in police officers,175 judges,176
physicians, 177 and the general public,178 but also in educators. For
example, Okonofua and Eberhardt conducted several controlled
experiments to measure how implicit racial biases affected educators’
decision-making in the disciplinary context.179 The researchers
recruited over 200 teachers from all across the country with varying
degrees of experience, backgrounds, and racial and ethnic identities.180
171 See Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 168, at 951; Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of
Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1514 (2005); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, “Continually
Reminded of Their Inferior Position”: Social Dominance, Implicit Bias, Criminality, and
Race, 46 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 23, 35 (2014); Jeffery J. Rachlinski, Sheri Lynn Johnson,
Andrew J. Wistrich & Chris Guthrie, Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?,
84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1197 (2009).
172 Kang et al., supra note 24, at 1142; see also Richardson & Goff, supra note 169,
at 2628.
173 See McIntosh et al., supra note 166, at 6; Richardson & Goff, supra note 169, at
2628; see also Nance, Implicit Racial Bias, supra note 28, at 58.
174 See Nance, Student Surveillance, supra note 20, at 823-26, for an extended
discussion of empirical studies documenting the effects of implicit racial bias.
175 See, e.g., Joshua Correll, Bernadette Park, Charles M. Judd, Bernd Wittenbrink,
Melody S. Sadler & Tracie Keese, Across the Thin Blue Line: Police Officers and Racial
Bias in the Decision to Shoot, 92 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 1006, 1020-22 (2007)
(finding evidence of racial bias in the speed with which officers made shoot/don’t shoot
decisions).
176 See, e.g., Rachlinski et al., supra note 171, at 1210 (finding a clear white
preference among white judges on the Implicit Association Test).
177 See, e.g., Alexander R. Green, Dana R. Carney, Daniel J. Pallin, Long H. Ngo,
Kristal L. Raymond, Lisa I. Iezzoni & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Bias Among Physicians
and Its Prediction of Thrombolysis Decisions for Black and White Patients, 22 J. GEN.
INTERNAL MED. 1231, 1235-37 (2007) (finding that the “interaction between implicit
anitblack bias and patient race on treatment recommendation was significant”); Janice
A. Sabin, Brian A. Nosek, Anthony G. Greenwald & Frederick P. Rivara, Physicians’
Implicit and Explicit Attitudes About Race by MD Race, Ethnicity, and Gender, 20 J. HEALTH
CARE FOR POOR & UNDERSERVED 896, 901 (2009) (finding a strong implicit preference
for White Americans over Black Americans for the MD sub-sample).
178 MAHZARIN R. BANAJI & ANTHONY G. GREENWALD, BLINDSPOT: HIDDEN BIASES OF
GOOD PEOPLE 47 (2013).
179 Okonofua & Eberhardt, supra note 166, at 618-22.
180 Id. at 620.
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Participant teachers viewed the school record of a student who
misbehaved twice — once for insubordination and once for a classroom
disturbance.181 The researchers manipulated the race of the
misbehaving student by using a stereotypical Black name (Darnell or
Deshawn) or white name (Greg or Jake).182 After reading about the
infractions, the teachers were asked to rate on a scale of one (not at all)
to seven (extremely) their answers to a series of questions that sought
to measure the severity of the student’s behavior, the extent to which
the student had disrupted the educational process, how irritated they
felt by the student’s behavior, and how severely the student should be
disciplined.183 They also were asked to rate, on a scale of one to five,
their perception on whether the student was a “troublemaker,” whether
they believed that the student’s behavior reflected a pattern of
misbehavior, and the extent to which they thought the student should
be suspended at some point in the future.184 The researchers learned
that when the student was Black, the teachers “felt significantly more
troubled by the second infraction,” believed that the student
“misbehavior should be met with more severe discipline,” more often
perceived the student as a “troublemaker,” more often perceived that
the student’s misbehavior was reflective of a negative pattern, and more
often “imagined themselves suspending that student in the future.”185
This study is consistent with other uncontrolled studies demonstrating
that minority students often receive more frequent and severe
punishment than similarly situated white students.186
II.

DATA AND EMPIRICAL STRATEGY

Our Study analyzes the nation’s leading cross-sectional data set on
public school crime and safety and supplements those data with
complementary information from other long-standing data sets. We test
our various hypotheses by estimating fractional response regression
models.

181

Id. at 618.
Id.
183 Id.
184 Id. at 620.
185 Id. at 619-22.
186 See, e.g., Clifton A. Casteel, Teacher-Student Interactions and Race in Integrated
Classrooms, 92 J. EDUC. RSCH. 115, 119 (2001) (describing how minority students
experience more negative interactions than white students).
182
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A. Data
This Study exploits data from the U.S. Department of Education’s
School Survey on Crime and Safety for the 2015–2016 school year
(“SSOCS”).187 We use the restricted-access version of the SSOCS data
set as it benefits from more granular school-level counts of the number
of incidents that schools reported to law enforcement agencies as well
as the number of full- and part-time SRO/police officers at each
school.188 As we have described this particular data set in detail
previously, what follows is a condensed description.189
To construct its sample, drawn from the universe of American public
K-12 schools, the National Center for Education Statistics (“NCES”)
pulled from the 2013–2014 school year Common Core of Data Public
Elementary/Secondary School Universe File (“CCD”)190 to help insure
that the weighted SSOCS data set reflects a representative sample of the
nation’s public K-12 schools.191 Insofar as our study focuses on “typical”
or “regular” schools, those schools described as something other than
187 Various results discussed in this Article also derive from the restricted-use
version of the 2009–2010 SSOCS data series.
188 INST. OF EDUC. SCI., DATA SEC. OFF., USER LICENSE NO. 19110005. The public
version of the SSOCS data set and codebook are available at
https://nces.ed.gov/pubsearch/pubsinfo.asp?pubid=2018109 (last visited Jan. 16, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/SQR2-W22B]. The restricted-use version of the 2015–2016 SSOCS
data set includes “a higher level of detail in the data compared to public-use data files.”
Statistical Standards Program: Getting Started, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS,
https://nces.ed.gov/statprog/instruct_gettingstarted.asp (last visited Jan. 16, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/8R6B-5A3U]. To comport with NCES’ requirements regarding
reporting unweighted results from restricted-use SSOCS data sets, we round all reported
“Ns” to the nearest 10 in our tables.
189 For a more complete description of our data set, see Heise & Nance, “Defund the
(School) Police”?, supra note 6, at 741-50.
190 The Common Core of Data (“CCD”) “is an NCES annual census system that
collects fiscal and nonfiscal data on all public schools, public school districts, and state
education agencies in the United States.” NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATS., U.S. DEP’T OF
EDUC., 2015–16 SCHOOL SURVEY ON CRIME AND SAFETY (SSOCS): RESTRICTED-USE DATA
FILE USER’S MANUAL 8 (Nov. 2017) [hereinafter Codebook] (on file with author). For
additional descriptions of the CCD, see Helen M. Marks & Jason P. Nance, Contexts of
Accountability Under Systemic Reform: Implications for Principal Influence on Instruction
and Supervision, 43 EDUC. ADMIN. Q. 3, 11 (2007) (describing the CCD); Nance,
Students, Police, supra note 5, at 959-60 (describing the CCD).
191 The total number of public schools sampled was 3,550; of those, 2,092 schools
submitted completed questionnaires for an overall response rate of 62.9 percent
(weighted sample; 58.9 percent (raw sample)). See Codebook, supra note 190, at 18;
NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATS., U.S. DEP’T. OF EDUC., 2015–2016 SCHOOL SURVEY ON CRIME
AND SAFETY (SSOCS): PUBLIC-USE DATA FILE USER’S MANUAL 1 (2018),
https://nces.ed.gov/pubsearch/pubsinfo.asp?pubid=2018107 [https://perma.cc/FSA8ARGT].
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“regular” were excluded from our analyses.192 To facilitate inferences to
the broader universe of “regular” public schools, the approximately
1,890 schools used in the analyses were weighted to generate
population-level estimates.193
Unlike most prior studies using earlier versions of the SSOCS data set,
our study supplements the SSOCS data set in two important ways that
we feel plausibly inform the probability of schools reporting student
disciplinary incidents to law enforcement agencies. First, we include
state-level information on what circumstances — and for what
particular student offenses or incidents — do federal or state laws
compel a school to report an incident to law enforcement agencies.194
Federal law, for example, requires all local education agencies (i.e.,
school districts) receiving federal education funding pursuant to the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act (which includes virtually
every “regular” public K-12 school) to implement a policy “requiring
referral to the criminal justice or juvenile delinquency system of any
student who brings a firearm or weapon to a school.”195 Such statutes,
in theory, should eliminate (or substantially reduce) school officials’
discretion insofar as they must report certain activities that occur on
school property to law enforcement agencies regardless of any
mitigating circumstances. At the same time, however, many state
statutes go beyond federally-imposed requirements and require that
schools also refer to law enforcement agencies for a range of student
incidents and offenses that do not involve a firearm or weapon.196

192 Among the total universe of 2,090 schools in the SSOCS data set, 1,890 (or 90.4
percent) were identified as a “regular public school” as serve as the focus of this study.
Most of the “non-regular” schools were either public charter or magnet schools. This
Article’s focus on “regular” public schools is consistent with parallel empirical work,
particularly in the school finance literature. See, e.g., IVY MORGAN & ARY AMERIKANER,
FUNDING GAPS 2018: TECHNICAL APPENDIX 3 (2018) (excluding “non-regular” schools
from the empirical analysis).
193 Data in most of our analyses used the final analysis weight (“FINALWGT”)
variable. Such sample weighting is necessary to “obtain population-leave estimates, to
minimize bias arising from differences between responding and nonresponding schools,
and to calibrate the data to known population characteristics in a way that reduces
sampling error.” Codebook, supra note 190, at 20.
194 In this way our current study more helpfully aligns with Nance’s prior study of
2009–2010 SSOCS data. See Nance, Students, Police, supra note 5, at 934-36.
195 20 U.S.C. § 7151(h)(1) (2021); see, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 1006.07(g) (2021)
(mandating that any student who brings a firearm or weapon to any school function
will be referred to the juvenile justice system).
196 See, e.g., supra notes 33–34 and accompanying text (describing various state
statutes that mandate reports to law enforcement for engaging in certain offenses).
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The second way we supplement the school-level SSOCS information
is with school district-level data on current per pupil spending.197
Specifically, we matched district-level spending data from the 2016 U.S.
Census Bureau’s publicly-available annual survey of public elementary
and secondary schools onto the SSOCS data set.198 Finally, we adjusted
the school district-level current per pupil spending data for cost-ofliving variations across the more than 13,000 public school districts
with data from the Comparable Wage Index.199
1.

Dependent Variables

This Article’s main analytic focus centers on comparing schools’ rates
of reporting and non-reporting student incidents to law enforcement
agencies partly as a function of the magnitude of a school’s SRO/police
presence. To this end, school officials reported the total number of
student disciplinary incidents that took place at their school during the
2015–16 school year, as well as the sub-set of those incidents that
resulted in school reports to law enforcement. The student “incident”
types that schools reported to law enforcement range from rapes and
robberies with a weapon to the distribution, possession, or use of
prescription drugs and “vandalism.”200
From these data we developed two dependent variables of interest in
parallel fashion. One involves a school’s rate of all school reports of
student disciplinary incident, if any, to law enforcement agencies.
Insofar as the types of student incidents that schools reported include
both violent (e.g., rape and armed robbery) as well as non-violent (e.g.,
197 For a discussion, see, for example, Michael Heise, Per Pupil Spending and Poverty’s
Persistent Penalty: An Empirical Analysis of 2016 District-Level NCES Data, 45 J. EDUC.
FIN. 149, 154-57 (2019).
198 2016 Public Elementary-Secondary Education Finance Data, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2016/econ/school-finances/secondary-educationfinance.html (last visited July 28, 2021) [https://perma.cc/S8NR-QLFD].
199 For a detailed description and explanation of the Comparable Wage Index, see
generally LORI L. TAYLOR & WILLIAM J. FOWLER, JR., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., NAT’L CTR. FOR
EDUC. STATS., A COMPARABLE WAGE APPROACH TO GEOGRAPHIC COST ADJUSTMENT (2006),
https://nces.ed.gov/pubsearch/pubsinfo.asp?pubid=2006321 [https://perma.cc/8NQA4DYX]. For a discussion of some of the limitations of the CWI adjustment, see Thomas
A. DeLuca, Instructional Spending Metrics: A Multilevel Analysis Using NCES Data, 44 J.
EDUC. FIN. 23, 42 (2018); Heise, Per Pupil, supra note 197, at 154-57.
200 The SSOCS data derive from school administrators’ reports on, for example,
“recorded student incidents.” As such, while instructions describing how such variables
were intended to be operationalized were included with the surveys to promote
consistency across schools, to some unknown degree these data inevitably reflect school
administrators’ interpretations of what constitutes a “student incident” warranting
“recording.”
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vandalism and possession of alcohol) incidents, we felt that the sub-set
of non-violent incidents warranted closer, independent inspection. This
is especially true to the extent that some schools may have been
systematically less inclined to report non-violent incidents to law
enforcement agencies. To this end we constructed a separate variable
capturing a school’s rate of reports to law enforcement for the subset of
non-violent student incidents.
Our second dependent variable of interest, constructed similarly to
our first, involves the rate of a school’s non-reports for all student
disciplinary incidents as well as a rate for non-violent student incidents.
School non-report counts derive from subtracting for each school the
number of school reports to law enforcement agencies from the total
number of recorded student incidents. We indexed each schools’ raw
report and non-report counts to generate rates to better account for
variation in school size or scale (expressed in terms of student
enrollment) across the 1,890 schools.201
Table 1 illustrates that schools’ mean disciplinary reporting rate falls
below one (0.77) per 100 students.202 By contrast, the mean rate of
school reports to police involving non-violent incidents is well under
one-half (0.33) per 100 students.203
Results in Table 1 also make clear that attention to schools’ exercise
of discretion in this context is warranted as schools’ non-reporting rates
exceed their reporting rates. For example, when it comes to all student
disciplinary incidents, the mean rate of school non-reporting (1.97 per
100 students) easily surpasses the rate of reporting to law enforcement
(0.77 per 100 students). Similarly, the mean rate of school nonreporting for non-violent student incidents (0.41 per 100 students) also
exceeds, albeit only by a small margin, the mean rate of school reports
(0.33 per 100 students). Notwithstanding federal, state, and district- or
201 Unreported alternative specifications exploring schools’ rates of incident reports
to police using the square root of the rate as its distribution is less distorted by schools
that reported no such incidents. Results from these unreported analyses do not materially
differ from our results that derive from non-transformed rates. See infra Table 3.
202 Thus, as the mean student enrollment in our school sample is just under 600
students (595.4), on average, each school reported just over four (4.6) incidents. Of
course, because only forty-nine percent of schools reported any incidents, the effective
mean number of incident reports to law enforcement is approximately nine incidents
among those schools that reported any incidents.
203 Similarly, as the mean student enrollment in our school sample is just under 600
students (595.4), on average each school reported just under two (1.98) non-violent
incidents. Of course, because only forty-nine percent of schools reported any incidents,
violent or non-violent, the effective mean number of non-violent incident reports to law
enforcement is approximately four non-violent incidents among those schools that
reported any incidents.
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school-level mandatory reporting policies, which vary in important
ways, when it comes to disciplining student incidents, school nonreporting emerges as important and a more common occurrence.204
We note at the outset that some coding protocols likely help explain
some of the disparity between schools’ report and non-report rates. For
example, the U.S. Department of Education codes student “attacks
without a weapon” and “threats of an attack without a weapon” as two
(among many) types of “violent” student incidents.205 Given the nature
of such incidents’ descriptions, particularly in light of their physical
(and threat of physical) dimension, such coding decisions remain
entirely understandable and, indeed, defensible.
At the same time, however, while we yield to the SSOCS’ coding
characterization decisions, we also understand that these two specific
incident codes likely include the proverbial student “fight” or “threat of
a fight” (or some such physical altercation). It is our hunch that schools
remain comparably more confident in handling such “traditional”
student incidents internally. Indeed, closer inspection of these two
incident codes reveals wide gaps in school referral and non-referral
rates. Thus, to the extent that school administrators continue to
exercise some level of discretion in deciding between student incidents
that warrant a formal law enforcement referral and those that do not,
we are not surprised to find evidence of considerable discretionary
activity clustered on these two student incident codes.
2.

Independent Variables

As our key analytical focus centers on the possible relation between a
school’s reporting and non-reporting behaviors and SRO/police
presence,206 one key independent variable of interest examines the
magnitude a school’s SRO/police presence, if any. As Table 1 illustrates,
the mean SRO/police presence was just under one (0.84) per school.207
Insofar as a school’s student disciplinary reporting practice is certainly
204 See infra notes 213–214 and accompanying text for a brief discussion on how
various mandatory reporting policies vary. See supra Part I.F for several possible
explanations for why it is more common for school officials to exercise discretion not
to report wrongdoing to law enforcement.
205 In the SSOCS Codebook, the relevant incident codes include C0330 and C0338,
respectively. Codebook, supra note 190, at C-53 to C-54.
206 A school’s SRO/police presence reflects the number of school resources officers
or sworn police officers present at a school at least once a week.
207 Again, however, insofar as only one-half of the schools in our sample report any
SRO/police officials present at least once a week, the effective number of law
enforcement officials at schools that report any is approximately 1.6 per school.
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the function of a complex interaction of a host of other factors, our
models include an array of control variables. Our various control
variables loosely organize into two general categories: school- and
student-level factors.
3.

School-Level Variables

As we seek to assess the probability of a school reporting (and not
reporting) student disciplinary incidents to law enforcement agencies,
factors such as a school’s base “disorder” level, student enrollment
“turbulence,” urbanicity score, and an assessment of the general crime
level where the school is located are likely relevant controls. To measure
a school’s base “disorder” level, we constructed a school disorder
variable by indexing a school’s total number of recorded student
disciplinary actions (per 100 students). Student enrollment turbulence
measures the total percentage of students who either transferred into or
out of the school during the 2015–16 school year. A school urbanicity
score construes a school’s geographic location on a four-point scale,
ranging from “rural” to “urban.” Finally, a three-point scale assessing a
school’s general crime level measure derives from school administrators’
reported perceptions of general crime levels in the area in which the
school is located.
While we indexed many key variables to better account for variation
in student enrollment across schools, we include raw student
enrollment as a separate independent variable to help explore whether
school scale effects (measured by student enrollment) exert any
influence on school reporting decisions. To the extent that small
schools are arguably more likely to facilitate the emergence of a
comparatively healthier school “climate” or “culture,”208 one plausible
hypothesis is that the rate of reporting student disciplinary incidents to
law enforcement agencies is likely to be higher in the larger and
presumably more impersonal school environments. For similar —
though distinct — reasons, we also include a variable measuring each
school’s student-to-teacher ratio.
A school’s fiscal strength is another plausible factor contributing to a
school’s general climate and culture. Higher spending schools are
comparatively better positioned to make critical financial investments
in additional personnel, equipment, and programs that can enhance a
school’s overall efficacy. To operationalize a school’s fiscal strength, we
208 See generally William J. Fowler, Jr. & Herbert J. Walberg, School Size,
Characteristics, and Outcomes, 13 EDUC. EVALUATION & POL’Y ANALYSIS 189 (1991)
(discussing the link between school size and educational outcomes).

2021]

To Report or Not to Report

249

turn to a standard proxy, annual (2015–16) current per pupil spending.
Specifically, we wonder whether variation in student investment
distributions might influence a school’s student discipline reporting
decisions. And even if such a relation or its direction are not obvious,
per pupil spending may capture other unobservable aspects of a school
that require controlling for.
To accomplish this, and to extend existing research in this manner,
we exploit the leading sources of school district-level per pupil
spending data: U.S. Census Bureau’s annual survey of public elementary
and secondary schools for financial information209 supplemented by the
U.S. Department of Education’s National Center for Education Statistics
Comparable Wage Index that adjusts for cost-of-living variation across
the nation for the more than 13,000 public school districts.210 We
settled on current expenditures partly as it facilitates comparisons of
student investment across the widest array of studies in the school
finance literature.211 As Table 1 makes clear, across all the schools in
our sample, mean current per pupil spending exceeded $11,000 in
2015–16.
Complicating slightly our decision to include per pupil spending data
is that our data include school district-level means. The total (raw)
number of “regular” schools in our sample (1,890) derive from 1,490
different school districts. Thus, 400 schools in our sample come from a
district that includes at least one or more other schools in the sample.
For those schools that share a school district, however, the district-level
current per pupil spending value does not vary. While admittedly not
ideal, to the extent that attention to per pupil spending discrepancies
typically focuses on variation across — rather than within — school
districts, the district-level per pupil spending data should not unduly
distort our results.212
209

See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 198.
For a detailed description and explanation of the Comparable Wage Index, see
generally TAYLOR & FOWLER, JR., supra note 199. For a discussion of some of the
limitations of the CWI adjustment, see, for example, DeLuca, supra note 199, at 42;
Heise, Per Pupil, supra note 197, at 162-63.
211 For a discussion, see, for example, Heise, Per Pupil, supra note 197, at 154-57.
212 But see, e.g., Ary Amerikaner, States Are Burying Damning Data About School
Funding, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/29/opinion/
school-district-funding-data.html [https://perma.cc/6MZX-9DUT] (describing the
unfair distribution of resources within some school districts). See also Simon Ejdemyr
& Kenneth A. Shores, Pulling Back the Curtain: Intra-District School Spending Inequality
and its Correlates 1 (Stanford Univ. & Univ. of Pa., Working Paper, 2017),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3009775 [https://perma.cc/FY8XVHJE].
210
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Insofar as mandatory school reporting obligations for various student
incidents by design bear squarely on our dependent variables of interest,
our models also control for whether officials at each school were
statutorily obligated to report various incident types to law enforcement
agencies under prevailing state law.213 To do so we draw from the
relevant statutes and regulations in all fifty states (and the District of
Columbia). Where a clear and relatively unambiguous mandatory
reporting obligation existed, our dummy variable is coded as “1.” To
facilitate our more focused analyses of the sub-pool of non-violent
student incidents we include two separate mandatory reporting
variables: one for violent student incidents; the other for non-violent
incidents. For our supplemental analyses on student incidents involving
drug use, possession, or distribution, we also include a dummy variable
for any state mandatory reporting requirements for student drug
violations.214
Finally, even though the majority of public schools in the United
States are elementary schools and, as Table 1 illustrates,215 our sample
reflects this (59 percent of the sampled schools are elementary schools),
the majority of school violence occurs in middle and high schools.
Despite the uneven distribution of school violence across school levels,
we remain mindful that the Sandy Hook (CT) Elementary School
tragedy in December 2012, unfolded only a few years prior to the data
gathering efforts that culminated in the 2015–2016 SSOCS data set.216
Consequently, we approached our Study with a particular curiosity
about how, if at all, elementary schools might systematically differ from
middle and high schools in terms of their proclivity to report (and not
report) student incidents to law enforcement agencies. To explore this
possibility, we include a dummy variable coded for “1” for elementary
schools.217
213 Our focus on state-specific mandatory reporting statutes implicitly acknowledges
that application of relevant federal reporting requirements, by definition, should not
have varied across the schools in our sample. State-level mandatory reporting
requirements, by contrast, did vary.
214 See infra Table 3.
215 For purposes of this study, an “elementary” school is defined to include a regular
school whose grade levels range from pre-kindergarten through, but not higher than,
eighth.
216 For a brief description of the Sandy Hook Elementary School tragedy, see Zachary
Posess, A Shot in the Dark: How the Sandy Hook Plaintiffs Established Legal Standing
Against the Gun Industry, 51 SETON HALL L. REV. 563, 563-64 (2020).
217 For purposes of this study, a school facility was coded as an “elementary” school
if the highest grade level present in the school facility was at (or below) the eighth grade
or lower and if the lowest grade level present was at (or below) the third grade.

2021]
4.

To Report or Not to Report

251

Student-Focused Variables

Along with various school- (and district- and state-) level variables
summarized above, key student-focused factors, especially those factors
reflecting possible student marginalization, plausibly influence a
school’s approach towards law enforcement agency reporting.218
Factors aligned with various student marginalization theses, and
inserted into our models, include each school’s percentage of all
nonwhite (including Black) and Black students, as well as the
percentage of students in poverty.219 Moreover, as boys are more likely
than girls to trigger school discipline matters, we also control for a
school’s percentage of male students.220 Table 1 presents basic summary
statistics on all the variables considered in our various models.
Table 1: Summary Descriptive Statistics
Dep. vars:
School Reports:
Rate of sch. reports (per 100 students) [all]
Rate of sch. reports (per 100 students) [non-vio.]
School Non-Reports:
Rate of sch. non-reps. (per 100 students) [all]
Rate of sch. non-reps. (per 100 students) [non-vio.]

Mean

S.D.

0.77
0.33

1.92
0.79

1.97
0.41

3.41
0.88

218 See, e.g., DAVID CANTOR & MAREENA MCKINLEY WRIGHT, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC.,
SCHOOL CRIME PATTERNS: A NATIONAL PROFILE OF U.S. PUBLIC HIGH SCHOOLS USING RATES
OF CRIME REPORTED TO POLICE 8 (2002), https://www2.ed.gov/offices/OUS/PES/studiesschool-violence/school-crime-pattern.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZHB5-5CFK] (finding that
large high schools located in urban areas serving a high percentage of minority students
tend to experience more school crime); TRAVIS III & COON, supra note 79, at 20
(observing that crime is more common in schools that serve students from
disadvantaged background); see also Aaron Kupchik & Geoff Ward, Race, Poverty, and
Exclusionary School Security: An Empirical Analysis of U.S. Elementary, Middle, and High
Schools, 12 YOUTH VIOLENCE & JUV. JUST. 332, 341-42 (2014); Nance, Dismantling the
School-to-Prison Pipeline, supra note 1, at 360-65.
219 Students in poverty include those students eligible to participate in a free or
reduced-lunch program. For a general discussion of various student poverty measures,
see Heise, Per Pupil, supra note 197, at 158.
220 Compare Skiba et al., supra note 144, at 320, 326 (explaining that males have
consistently been found to be suspended and expelled at higher rates than females), and
J. M. Wallace, Jr., Sara Goodkind, Cynthia M. Wallace & Jerald G. Bachman., Racial,
Ethnic, and Gender Differences in School Discipline Among U.S. High School Students:
1991-2005, 59 NEGRO EDUC. REV. 47 (2008) (explaining that research indicates that
Black males have the highest suspension rates), with Nance, Students, Police, supra note
5, at 972-73 (reporting “mixed” results as it relates to the influence of various student
background characteristics of school incident reports to law enforcement).
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Ind. vars:
Number of full- and part-time SRO/police at sch.
Sch. student:teacher ratio
Sch. student mobility % (in/out)
Sch. urbanicity scale (rural-to-urban; 1-4)
Sch. disorder report rate (per 100 students)
Sch. area crime scale (low-to-high; 1-3)
Sch. student enrollment
Elementary school (1=yes)
Mand. sch. violent incident report req.(1=yes)
Mand. sch. non-violent incident report req. (1=yes)
Mand. sch. drug incident report req. (1=yes)
Sch. student poverty %
Sch. student nonwhite %
Sch. student Black %
Sch. student male %
Sch. dist. mean per pupil spending (2016 $s)

[Vol. 55:209

0.84
17.79
15.05
2.51
1.57
1.31
595.4
0.59
0.90
0.69
0.69
56.15
43.1
12.46
49.7
11,196

2.44
23.58
14.02
1.14
3.10
0.58
413.9
0.49
0.30
0.46
0.46
27.29
32.92
20.91
9.1
5,153

NOTES: Reported means and standard deviations derive from the SSOCS weighted
sample; N (unweighted)=1,890.
SOURCES: U. S. Dept. Educ., Nat’l Ctr. Educ. Statistics, 2015–16 School Survey on Crime
and Safety (SSOCS); U.S. Dept. Comm., Census Bureau, 2016 Public ElementarySecondary Education Finance File (2016).

B. Empirical Strategy
We first assess whether variation in the number of SRO/police
officials present at each school systematically informs schools’ rates of
law enforcement agency reporting and non-reporting. To do so, we
estimate fractional response regression models of a continuous variable
— the rate of school incident reports (and non-reports) to law
enforcement agencies — bounded between zero and one.221
221 Insofar as our dependent variable is a rate (or fraction) bounded between zero
and one (inclusive), we preferenced fractional response regression models. Owing to
the possibility of over-dispersion, and in an abundance of caution, however, we also
considered two alternative specifications in an effort to ensure that our core results were
robust to model specification. Unreported results from a binomial regression model as
well as a negative binomial regression model using actual raw school-level count data
do not materially differ from results presented in Table 2. See infra Table 2. As well, to
account for possible selection effects we also estimated Heckman models. Once again,
the unreported results do not materially differ from those presented in Table 2. See id.
For examples of a similar empirical strategy, see, for example, Daniel Hamlin & Angran
Li, The Relationship Between Parent Volunteering in School and School Safety in
Disadvantaged Urban Neighborhoods, 19 J. SCH. VIOLENCE 362, 366-68 (2020).
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C. Data and Empirical Strategy Limitations
Despite the SSOCS data set’s obvious strengths, it is not without
limitations. In particular, while data exist on a variety of school- and
student-level measures, including a school’s gender and racial/ethnic
profiles, the data set does not include gender or racial information on
the students involved in the disciplinary incidents that triggered school
reports to law enforcement agencies or non-reports. The absence of
such information, of course, functionally precludes inferences about
whether school incident reporting policies distribute in ways that skew
at the individual-level against, for example, boys or racial/ethnic
minorities, or both.
Similarly, given the absence of particularized and follow-up data on
those students who engaged in incidents that resulted in school reports
to law enforcement agencies, we cannot know what actually happened
to those students reported. The absence of more particularized data on
the law enforcement referrals’ outcomes, however, does not deflect from
the larger point that any student referral to law enforcement is
important and, to some extent, likely changes that student’s future for
the worse.222 Regardless of (or in addition to) any formal legal
consequences, a school’s referral to law enforcement itself can also
culminate with, in the school context, student discipline, suspensions,
or expulsions.223
In terms of our empirical strategy, we remain mindful that research
design limitations preclude the findings from supporting any causal
claims. In a more “perfect” world, to assess any possible causal relations
between a school’s reporting behavior and the magnitude of its
SRO/police presence we would, for example, want to randomly assign
SRO/police officers to otherwise identical schools (that is, “identical” as
it relates to our various dependent variables of interest). In so doing, we
could better isolate potential causality, and its direction, in our models.
As we do not possess any control over randomization, we therefore
cannot assess with precision whether the number of SRO/police officers
at a school’s is a product of pre-existing student disruption or crime
levels (“incidents”). It is also plausible that the presence of SRO/police
officers at the school itself influences a school’s reporting decisions.
As an admittedly “second best” empirical strategy, we exploit a rich
array of control variables designed to help disentangle the complex
222

See supra Part I.E.
See supra Part I.E. See generally Hawker v. Sandy City Corp., 774 F.3d 1243,
1245-46 (10th Cir. 2014) (describing the negative repercussions of the intersection
between the criminal justice system and schools).
223
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relations between and among our dependent and key independent
variables of interest. For example, as it specifically relates to our
hypotheses on a relation between SRO/police officers at a school and
that school’s student disciplinary reporting behavior, our models seek
to control, as best that existing data permit, for other likely factors that
bear on a school’s probability of reporting incidents to law enforcement.
While these important data and research design factors preclude strong
causal claims, at a descriptive level we nonetheless feel that our results
are positioned to contribute to the existing knowledge base on school
crime and safety and the school-to-prison pipeline literature.224
III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
To explore whether variation in the number of SRO/police officials
present at a school informs the school’s law enforcement agency
reporting (and non-reporting) behaviors, we estimate fractional
response regression models of a continuous rate (or fractional) variable
— specifically, the rate of school student disciplinary reports to law
enforcement agencies (models 1 and 2) and non-reports (models 3 and
4). The sweep of results presented in Table 2 — specifically, a
comparison across models 1 and 2 and models 3 and 4 — uncovers
three general themes that run throughout our analyses. One involves
the SRO/police presence’s inconsistent — or at least uneven —
influence across school reporting and non-reporting behaviors. A
second relates to an overall paucity of evidence that would help scaffold
any distributional concerns when it comes to schools’ reporting and
non-reporting behaviors in the student discipline context. Third, the
suite of various control variables generally behaves with consistency
and in a manner that comports with expectations.
A. The SRO/Police Presence’s Uneven Influence Across the School
Reporting and Non-Reporting Contexts
As results in Table 2 for models 1 and 2 make clear, an increase in the
magnitude of a school’s SRO/police presence corresponds with a
systematic increase in the school’s rate of student discipline referrals to
law enforcement agencies. While a school’s SRO/police presence
influenced schools’ reporting rates, results in models 3 and 4 imply that
224 As well, the data and empirical strategy factors that limit the force of the claims
in this study are similar to limitations that attach to prior studies on this topic. See, e.g.,
Heise & Nance, “Defund the (School) Police”?, supra note 6, at 752 (noting the data and
empirical strategy limitations); Nance, Students, Police, supra note 5, at 974 (explaining
the limitations of the empirical study).
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a school’s SRO/police presence did not, however, influence its nonreporting rates in a similar manner. In isolation, of course, the null
findings in models 3 and 4 do not offer much in terms of interpretative
force. But when considered in relation to results for the same variable
in models 1 and 2, the absence of statistically significant results for the
SRO/police presence influence in the non-reporting context likely takes
on a bit more meaning.
The clear thrust of prior research (including our own), along with
results in models 1 and 2, make clear that increases in a school’s
SRO/police presence correspond with increases in the school’s
probability of reporting student discipline incidents to law enforcement
agencies.225 Indeed, such a finding largely comports with common sense
given that SRO/police officers come into schools with professional ties
to, experiences with, and commitments to law enforcement.226 Indeed,
it is this very finding that helps fuel long-standing (and growing)
critiques leveled against schools’ increasingly “legalized” posture
toward student discipline.227 While it is persistently clear that a school’s
SRO/police officer presence increases the likelihood of the school
reporting, results in models 3 and 4 suggest that variation in a school’s
SRO/police presence did not systematically influence the school’s
decision to not report.
What might explain the asymmetric influence of a school’s
SRO/police presence is not immediately clear and certainly warrants
deeper exploration. One possible explanation for this divergence is that
school administrators may be acting strategically and, perhaps, in
coordination with SRO/police officers in terms of when — and under
what conditions — to exercise reporting discretion.228 Insofar as
decisions about whether to report student disciplinary incidents to law

225

See supra Part I.D.
See KUPCHIK, HOMEROOM SECURITY, supra note 79, at 83-89; JAMES & MCCALLION,
supra note 65, at 2; Gupta-Kagan, Reevaluating, supra note 73, at 2039; Theriot, supra
note 11, at 281.
227 See, e.g., Fedders, supra note 52, at 573-74 (referencing the rise of student
referrals to law enforcement); Gupta-Kagan, The School-to-Prison Pipeline, supra note
33, at 103 (explaining that officers have arrested students for non-violent conduct that
should not be classified as a delinquency matter); Ryan et al., supra note 86, at 188
(documenting the growing concerns regarding school resource officers); Wolf, supra
note 86, at 222 (introducing SROs as a feature of the trend of “criminalization” of
American public school students).
228 See KUPCHIK, HOMEROOM SECURITY, supra note 79, at 158 (observing, in an
ethnographic study, that school officials often relied on SROs as “legal adviser[s] of
sorts” to determine when offenses should be reported to law enforcement for
processing).
226
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enforcement rest with senior school administrators rather than
individual SRO/police officers, the absence of any statistical significance
in models 3 and 4 implies that something other than a school’s
SRO/police presence corresponds with decisions to not report.229 And
this something, we hypothesize, includes school administrators
exercising their discretion and deciding to keep some student
disciplinary incidents “in-house.”
But why would senior school administrators elect to exercise their
professional discretion, decide to not report, and, instead, address a
student disciplinary incident internally rather than formally engage
local law enforcement professionals? The admittedly complex
incentives run along institutional and individual-level dimensions and
in potentially different directions. At the institutional-level, schools that
address student disciplinary matters internally and outside the purview
of law enforcement agencies are better positioned to contain potentially
harmful information that can degrade a school’s reputation (real or
perceived) as a “safe,” “secure,” or “orderly” school.230 At the same time,
however, we also can easily envision how some school administrators
seeking to enhance their schools’ reputation for “security” and “order”
may be more inclined to report to law enforcement agencies, as it
plausibly sends a signal to various school constituencies that such
schools are “tough on crime” and take student misconduct “seriously.”
It is also plausible that school administrators may feel comparatively
better positioned to efficiently, fairly, and efficaciously handle certain
student discipline matters than law enforcement professionals. After all,
educators likely have far more experience dealing with student conduct
issues. Moreover, given the potential reach of many state penal statutes,
what school administrators may deem to be a “minor scuffle” may fall
within the technical ambit of a criminal misdemeanor assault.231 If so,
this may influence how school administrators formally “characterize”
(and formally code) a student discipline incident.
Similarly, a related — though distinct — possibility is that school
administrators’ decisions to not report student disciplinary incidents

229 While school officials may determine when to refer students to law enforcement,
it is important to acknowledge that if SRO/police observe or encounter evidence
justifying the arrest of a student, SRO/police may arrest a student over the objection of
a school official. See Brown, Understanding and Assessing School Police Officers, supra
note 83, at 591; see, e.g., OFF. OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., supra note 83, at 51
(describing an incident where an SRO arrested a student over a school administrator’s
objections).
230 See O’Matz & Travis, supra note 127; Travis et al., supra note 127.
231 See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
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may reflect their concerns about the individual-level costs to students
that invariably attach after a formal engagement with the criminal
justice system.232 That is, school administrators, informed by their
professional experience with students (and their transgressions), may
feel that formally engaging law enforcement agencies imposes too many
costs on students (above and beyond any discipline meted out by the
schools). A school’s impulse to decline to report may be especially acute
where the nature of the student incident involves conduct that schools
had typically dealt with internally in the past. Finally, where public and
political opposition to schools’ increasingly legalistic student discipline
posture has grown — possibly in response to the potentially significant
costs borne by students thrust into the criminal justice system — one
institutional reaction would involve school administrators’ exerting
greater discretion and not reporting various student incidents,
especially for those student incidents located at the margins.
A final complicating wrinkle pivots on the possibility that variation
in the type (and nature) of the student misconduct itself may inform
whether schools are more (or less) inclined to report to law enforcement
agencies. To better explore this possible distinction, we report separate
results in Table 2 for “all” student disciplinary incidents (models 1 and
3) as well as a subset of non-violent incidents (models 2 and 4). What
results in Table 2 make clear, however, is that in general schools treated
the subset of non-violent student incidents (models 2 and 4) and the
universe of student incidents (models 1 and 3) more-or-less similarly.
B. A Paucity of Support for Distributional Concerns
A second general theme that emerges with clarity in Table 2 relates to
distributional concerns. That is, widespread public sentiment suggests
that school decisions to report and not report student disciplinary
incidents to law enforcement agencies likely distribute unevenly across
various student sub-groups and in ways to disadvantage vulnerable
students.233 In terms of these distributional concerns, two points
warrant emphasis. First, the results in Table 2 are, on balance, notable
for a general absence of any statistically significant findings that would
give rise to traditional equity concerns. Second, in a few of the small
number of instances where a distributional variable achieves statistical
significance, the coefficient points in a direction that, if anything,
dampens these traditional distributional concerns.

232
233

See supra Part I.E.
See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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While each of the two points, alone, is instructive, the cumulative
weight of both points is even more so. First, as it relates to school
reporting rates, aside from one exception, none of the results imply any
disadvantages for vulnerable student sub-groups of students. The only
exception is that for non-violent student incidents (model 2), we note
that an increase in a school’s percentage of students in poverty
corresponds with an increased rate of reports to law enforcement
agencies. Not only do our results relating to school reporting behavior
(models 1 and 2) tilt in a direction that reduce traditional distributional
concerns, but they comport with prior empirical research that exploits
SSOCS data sets.234
Second, findings relating to school non-report rates — and these
discrete exercises of school administrators’ discretion — similarly fail
to raise any troubling distributional concerns. Moreover, in all of the
(few) instances where distributional variables achieve statistical
significance in models 3 and 4, their coefficients point in a direction
that dampens distributional worries — at least as it relates to traditional
distributional worries. For example, increases in the proportions of
male students and students in poverty correlate with increases in the
school’s decision to not report non-violent student disciplinary matters
to law enforcement agencies. Similarly, in terms of all student incidents,
increases in a school’s percentage of Black students corresponds with a
systematic increase in the school’s decision to not report. Again, while
the race, ethnicity, and gender of those students who engaged in the
reportable incidents are not included in the SSOCS data set, what the
results in Table 2 imply is that at the school-level unit of analysis the
distribution of schools exercising discretion and not reporting does not
fuel traditional equity concerns.
While these results may surprise some, especially because racial
inequalities persist in so many other areas of school discipline,
educational outcomes, the criminal justice system, and society
generally, our findings are consistent with other empirical studies
examining racial disparities in school disciplinary outcomes and with
our current understanding of when implicit racial bias tends to exert
the most influence.235 Specifically, when disciplinary incidents require
school officials to subjectively characterize student behavior, the effects
of implicit racial bias are more pronounced.236 But objectively-defined
234 See, e.g., Heise & Nance, “Defund the (School) Police”?, supra note 6, at 762
(reporting a lack of obvious distributional concerns based on SSOCS data sets); Nance,
Students, Police, supra note 5, at 969 (same).
235 See supra Part I.H.
236 See id.
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offenses, which are the basis of the vast majority of referrals to law
enforcement (e.g., possession of drugs and weapons, fighting, theft), are
more robust to the effects of implicit racial bias, resulting in fewer
distributional concerns.237
C. Various School Characteristics
As it relates to the suite of school characteristic variables, one notable
finding involves school size. School size is important because it achieves
statistical significance across all four models and, even more
importantly, it is the only other (aside from SRO/police presence)
institutional control variable that behaves differently in the school
report and school non-report contexts. Specifically, when it comes to
the probability of a school reporting a student incident to a law
enforcement agency (models 1 and 2), an increase in a school’s size
(construed here in terms of student enrollment) corresponds with an
increased probability of the school reporting. When it comes to a school
electing to not report (models 3 and 4), however, school size’s influence
runs in the opposite direction. That is, a decrease in a school’s size
corresponds with an increase in the probability of the school not
reporting a student disciplinary incident.
Taken together, these results imply that to the extent that school nonreporting rates reflect school administrator’s exercise of discretion in a
manner favorable to its students, such discretion is more likely to
emerge in comparatively smaller school settings. We attribute this to
smaller schools’ comparative advantages in developing greater school
cohesion and community.238 Our results suggest that a school’s scale,
and the related implications for a school’s climate and the
student/teacher interactions that implicitly flow from a smaller school
environment, provide a setting more conducive for school
administrators to act in ways that reduce the likelihood that student
disciplinary incidents will be reported to law enforcement agencies.
Aside from school size, while the remaining control variables
capturing various aspects of school characteristics behave generally
unremarkably, some complicating (or perplexing) wrinkles emerge. For
example, elementary schools were systematically less likely to both
report and non-report than non-elementary schools. While the former
237

See Girvan, supra note 111, at 1007-08; see also supra Part I.H.
See generally KATHLEEN COTTON, SCHOOL SIZE, SCHOOL CLIMATE, AND STUDENT
PERFORMANCE (1996), https://educationnorthwest.org/sites/default/files/SizeClimateand
Performance.pdf [https://perma.cc/TA68-FSBJ] (summarizing research on the benefits of
smaller schools).
238
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strikes us as far more predictable than the latter, we also note that
elementary schools in general behave quite differently than nonelementary schools in the school disciplinary space largely owing to
elementary schools’ materially different experiences with student
discipline issues.239 Likely contributing to elementary schools’ peculiar
influence in the student discipline context is that the comparatively
younger students generate a fewer number of disciplinary incidents.
Among those disciplinary incidents that do arise, they are less severe
than student disciplinary incidents occurring in middle- and high
schools.240 Each of these factors, and their complex interactions, help
explain elementary schools’ comparatively smaller footprint when it
comes to formally engaging law enforcement in student discipline.
Similarly, aside from one exception (model 2; non-violent mandatory
reporting requirements), none of the various mandatory student
incident reporting statutes achieve statistical significance. The deep
penetration of such statutes across the nation reduces the observable
variation across individual schools and, as such, dampens the potential
for achieving statistical significance. As well, such null results for these
variables generally comport with prior research.241
Finally, it remains truly perplexing that increases in a school’s
disorder rate correspond with increases in the probability of both school
reports and non-reports. While evidence of school disorder’s influence
is clear, its causal direction is not. That is, does increased school
reporting contribute to a net deterioration in a school’s overall climate,
which, in turn, fuels more disorder?242 Or, in contrast, does increased
school disorder lead to more school referrals to law enforcement by
which schools seek more control? Similarly, our findings also imply that
we need to consider whether school non-reporting contributes to a

239 See, e.g., Heise & Nance, “Defund the (School) Police”?, supra note 6, at 764-69
(analyzing student and school characteristics that are related to referrals to law
enforcement in the elementary school context).
240 For a fuller account of the elementary school context, see id.
241 See id. at 757; see also Nance, Students, Police, supra note 5, at 973.
242 See Matthew P. Mayer & Peter E. Leone, A Structural Analysis of School Violence
and Disruption: Implications for Creating Safer Schools, 22 EDUC. & TREATMENT CHILD.
333, 350, 352 (1999) (finding that student victimization and school disorder were
higher in schools using intense surveillance measures); Matthew P. Steinberg, Elaine
Allensworth & David W. Johnson, What Conditions Support Safety in Urban Schools?:
The Influence of School Organizational Practices on Student and Teacher Reports of Safety
in Chicago, in CLOSING THE SCHOOL DISCIPLINE GAP: EQUITABLE REMEDIES FOR EXCESSIVE
EXCLUSION, 118, 127-29 (Daniel J. Losen ed., 2015) (observing that teachers and
students reported lower levels of perceived safety in schools relying on more punitive
measures to maintain order and control).
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deterioration in school climate. If so, does such a deterioration fuel
more school disorder or, in contrast, is more disorder associated with
less reporting because they both are associated with general
dysfunction? Another — perhaps even more likely — alternative is that
school reporting, non-reporting, and disorder levels interact and flow
in both (or multiple) directions concurrently.243 It is also possible that
this potentially confusing finding may be a statistical artifact flowing
from the fact that schools that experience elevated rates of disorder are
among those forced to make a greater number of decisions about
whether to report or not.
Table 2: Fractional Response Regression Models of School Report and
Non-Report Rates for All and Non-Violent Student Discipline Incidents
to Law Enforcement Agencies
School Reports
(1)
All Incidents
Ttl. SRO/police
at school

School Non-Reports

(2)
Non-violent
Incidents

0.03** (0.01) 0.02** (0.01)

(3)
All Incidents

(4)
Non-violent
Incidents

0.01

(0.01) -0.01

(0.02)

Student:teacher
ratio

-0.01

(0.01) -0.00

(0.00)

-0.00

(0.00)

0.00

(0.00)

Student
mobility %

0.02*

(0.01) 0.01*

(0.00)

0.01

(0.00)

0.00

(0.00)

Sch. urban.
scale (rural-tourban)

-0.08

(0.08) -0.03

(0.05)

-0.01

(0.05) -0.06

(0.08)

0.08**

(0.02) 0.03**

(0.01)

0.12

(0.10) 0.24*

(0.10)
(0.00)

Sch. disorder
rate
Sch. area crime
(lo-to-hi)

0.06** (0.02) 0.03** (0.01)
0.07

(0.11) 0.19*

(0.09)

Sch. student
enroll.

0.00** (0.00) 0.00** (0.00)

-0.00** (0.00) -0.00*

Elem. sch.
(1=yes)

-1.23** (0.26) -2.21** (0.19)

-0.31** (0.12) -1.18** (0.13)

Vio. incid. rep.
req. (1=yes)

-0.52

(0.32)

0.04

(0.17)

-0.43*

(0.21)

0.22

(0.20)

243 See Mayer & Leone, supra note 242, at 351 (concluding that “disorder and
restrictive management of the school premises may go hand in hand and may feed off
each other”).
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Non-vio incid.
rep. req.
(1=yes)

-0.16

(0.13) -0.35** (0.11)

-0.01
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(0.13) -0.11

(0.13)

Sch. poverty %

0.00

(0.00) 0.00*

(0.00)

0.00

(0.00) 0.01*

(0.00)

Sch. nonwhite %

0.00

(0.00)

(0.00)

-0.00

(0.00)

0.00

(0.00)

0.00

Sch. black %

-0.00

(0.00) -0.01

(0.00)

0.01**

(0.00) -0.00

(0.00)

Sch. male %

-0.02

(0.01) -0.00

(0.01)

0.01

(0.01) 0.02**

(0.01)

Sch. dist. mean
per pup. Spend.

-0.00

(0.00) -0.00

(0.00)

-0.00

(0.00) -0.00

(0.00)

Constant

-3.25** (0.85) -5.57** (0.36)

-3.99** (0.41) -6.33** (0.37)

Pseudo R2

0.08

0.09

0.05

0.04

N (unweighted)

1,890

1,890

1,890

1,890

NOTES: The dependent variables include (model 1) the rate of school reports for all
incidents to law enforcement, (model 2) the rate of school reports for only non-violent
incidents to law enforcement, (model 3) the rate of school non-reports for all incidents
to law enforcement, and (model 4) the rate of school non-reports for only non-violent
incidents to law enforcement. Robust standard errors, clustered on school district, in
parentheses. The models were estimated using the “fracreg logit” command in Stata
(v.16.1) and SSOCS weighted data. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01.
SOURCES: U.S. Dept. Educ., Nat’l Ctr. Educ. Stats., 2015–16 School Survey on Crime and
Safety (SSOCS); U.S. Dept. Comm., Census Bureau, 2016 Public Elementary-Secondary
Education Finance File (2016).

IV. A CLOSER LOOK AT SCHOOL DISCRETION AND DECISIONS TO
REPORT AND NOT REPORT
We noted previously that variation in the type (and nature) of the
student disciplinary incident itself may inform whether schools are
more (or less) inclined to report to law enforcement agencies.244 While
in prior analyses we isolate non-violent student disciplinary incidents
for closer inspection, we nonetheless felt that variation across student
disciplinary incident codes likewise warrants more careful scrutiny.
This is particularly so if, as we hypothesize, exercises of school
administrative discretion are more likely for certain student disciplinary
incidents than others.
To explore this possibility we compare results for two distinct student
disciplinary incident codes: Drug (possession and/or distribution) and
threat of assault (without a weapon).245 We selected these two specific
244
245

See supra Part III.A.
See infra Table 3.
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student disciplinary incident codes because the former (drug possession
and/or distribution) is an unambiguous criminal act that falls squarely
within mandatory state (and federal) reporting statutes. That is to say,
in most states, schools confronting a student caught possessing or
distributing illicit drugs stare at an uncontested affirmative formal duty
to report such a matter to law enforcement agencies. School
administrators confronting a student threat of an assault without a
weapon, by contrast, likely find themselves in far more nuanced and
ambiguous terrain, especially as it relates to how best to characterize
such an incident as well as any law enforcement agency reporting
obligations.
In addition, we were interested in whether there were any
distributional concerns with respect to these two specific incidents.
Prior research suggests that we were less likely to find racial disparities
relating to drug possession, because this is an objectively-defined
offense that is more robust to the effects of implicit racial bias.246 But
the literature provides far less guidance regarding whether such
distributional concerns would exist regarding incidents involving
threats to attack another student without a weapon, which arguably
require somewhat more subjective judgment by a school official and
may trigger the effects of implicit racial bias.247 Nevertheless, it is also
possible that a “threat of physical attack” is more objective than a
determination that a student is “defiant,” “disrespectful,” or
“disruptive,” all of which require a great deal of subjective judgment
and all of which normally lead to more racially disparate disciplinary
outcomes.248
As it pertains to school reporting rates, (models 1 and 2), results in
Table 3 make clear that while a school’s reporting behavior for student
drug and threat incidents share many influences, important differences
emerge as well. Consistent with past findings, increases to a school’s
SRO/Police presence correspond with increased reporting rates, and this
finding holds for both drug and threat of assault incidents. Similarly,
student mobility, school disorder, elementary schools, and, to some
degree, mandatory reporting requirement variables behave consistently
across the drug and threat of assault contexts.
Regarding school reporting rates, where differences between the drug
and threat of physical attack contexts emerge, they focus on
246

See supra Parts I.G., I.H.
See supra Parts I.G., I.H. Of the variables available to us, we judge “threat of
physical attack” as the variable that would be most likely to invite subjective judgment
by a school official.
248 See supra Part I.G.
247
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distributional variables. Once again, however, these variables’ directions
point in competing directions. For example, for drug offenses, increases
in a school’s percentage of Black students correspond with a reduced
likelihood of a school to report. This finding is consistent with prior
empirical studies examining racial disparities in school disciplinary
outcomes involving illegal substances.249 Findings consistent with more
traditional, commonly-held distributional concerns, however, include
that increases in a school’s percentage of students in poverty and
nonwhite students correlate with an increased likelihood of the school
reporting a student drug incident. Similarly, higher per pupil spending
schools were systematically less likely to report drug matters.
By contrast, none of the distributional variables achieve statistical
significance for threat of physical attack (with no weapon) incidents.
Again, it is possible that this offense, which plausibly invites more
subjectivity than possession of drugs, still invites far less subjectivity
than other incidents, such as defiance, disrespect, and disruption, where
racially disparate outcomes are more common.250 In addition, one must
not forget the potential negative attention a referral to law enforcement
can bring to a school.251 Such forces may motivate many school officials
to avoid referring students to law enforcement for relatively minor
incidents, such as threats without using a weapon,252 and this
inclination may operate equally across all student groups.
Results for school non-reporting (models 3 and 4) imply a slightly
different overall picture. First, a school’s SRO/police presence, while
important when it comes to school reporting, is not statistically
important for school non-reporting decisions. Taken together, these
findings imply the possibility that when schools exercise discretion to
not report such student incidents, school administrators effectively
either remove the SRO/police from the reporting decision, work in
concert with SRO/police, or functionally override any SRO/police
inclination to report.
Second, unlike what we discovered in the school reporting context
(models 1 and 2), in the school non-reporting context, no material
249 See FABELO ET AL., supra note 107, at 45 (finding that African-American students
had about a twenty-three percent lower likelihood of facing mandatory school
disciplinary actions relating to mandatory removal from school under state law); Huang
& Cornell, supra note 137, at 305 (finding that white student suspension rates were
higher for alcohol, tobacco, and drug-related offenses); see also Nance, Students, Police,
supra note 5, at 973 (finding the percentage of minority students a school serves to be
generally insignificant as to most offenses).
250 See supra Parts I.G., I.H.
251 See supra Part I.F.
252 See supra Part II.A.1.
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differences emerged between the drug and threat of assault incidents
that give rise to any traditional distributional worries. Thus, the results
in models 3 and 4, overall, dampen any standard distributional concerns
when it comes to school non-reports.253
Overall, a closer look at two discrete student incident codes reveals
some plausibly interesting and more granular wrinkles. However,
nothing in Table 3 fundamentally or materially dislodges our two core
findings from analyses of school reporting and non-reporting behaviors
in the broader student disciplinary space. Specifically, the salience of a
school’s SRO/police presence is comparatively more important in the
school reporting than non-reporting context. Second, traditional
distributional worries do not, on balance, find strong empirical support
either in terms of when schools report, but also when schools decide to
not report.
Table 3: Fractional Response Regression Models of School Report Rates
to Law Enforcement Agencies and Non-Report Rates for Student Drug
and Threat of Assault (With No Weapon) Incidents

Ttl. SRO/police at
school
Student:teacher ratio
Student mobility %
Sch. urban. scale
(rural-to-urban)
Sch. disorder rate
Sch. area crime (lo-tohi)
Sch. student enroll.
Elem. sch. (1=yes)
Vio. incid. rep. req.
(1=yes)
Non-vio. incid. rep.
req. (1=yes)
Drug incid. rep. req.
(1=yes)

School Reports
School Non-Reports
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Drugs
Threat, with no
Drugs
Threat, with no
weapon
weapon
0.02** (0.01) 0.04* (0.02) -0.03 (0.02) 0.02 (0.01)
-0.00 (0.00) -0.03 (0.02)
0.01** (0.00) 0.03** (0.01)
-0.04 (0.06) -0.02 (0.13)

0.00
0.00
0.03

(0.00) -0.00 (0.00)
(0.01) 0.01* (0.01)
(0.12) 0.05 (0.09)

0.04** (0.01) 0.07** (0.02) 0.04** (0.01) 0.06** (0.01)
0.16 (0.10) -0.21 (0.25) 0.46* (0.20) 0.02 (0.14)
0.00** (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) -0.00* (0.00)
-3.01** (0.37) -0.89* (0.38) -2.13** (0.43) -0.47** (0.18)
-----1.16* (0.49)
-----0.62 (0.34)
---

---

-0.34** (0.12)

0.11

(0.31)

---

---

0.15

(0.20)

---

---

0.20

(0.24)

---

---

253 We note, however, that increases in the percentage of a school’s black students
corresponds with a reduced likelihood of the school electing to not report a student
drug incident. See supra Table 3.
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(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.01)
(0.00)

0.00
-0.00
0.00
-0.02
0.00

(0.01) 0.00 (0.01)
(0.00) 0.01 (0.01)
(0.01) -0.01* (0.01)
(0.01) 0.00 (0.01)
(0.00) -0.00 (0.00)
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Sch. poverty %
Sch. nonwhite %
Sch. black %
Sch. male %
Sch. dist. mean per
pup. Spend.

0.01**
0.01*
-0.01**
-0.00
-0.00*

0.00
-0.00
0.00
-0.00
-0.00

(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.01)
(0.00)

Constant
Pseudo R2
N (unweighted)

-6.69** (0.37) -4.93** (1.02) -8.55** (0.55) -4.94** (0.60)
0.11
0.09
0.07
0.04
1,890
1,890
1,890
1,890

NOTES: The dependent variable in models 1 and 2 is the rate of school reports to law
enforcement agencies for student drug and threat of assault with no weapon incidents,
respectively. The dependent variable in models 3 and 4 is the rate of school non-reports
for student drug and threat of assault with no weapon incidents, respectively. Robust
standard errors, clustered on school district, in parentheses. The models were estimated
using the “fracreg logit” command in Stata (v.16.1) and SSOCS weighted data. * p<0.05;
** p<0.01.
SOURCES: U.S. Dept. Educ., Nat’l Ctr. Educ. Stats., 2015–16 School Survey on Crime and
Safety (SSOCS); U.S. Dept. Comm., Census Bureau, 2016 Public Elementary-Secondary
Education Finance File (2016).

CONCLUSION
Engaging the criminal justice system in the student disciplinary
context invokes an array of important consequences on both individual
students and schools. Given these consequences, attention to, and focus
on, rates of school reporting incidents to law enforcement agencies, as
well as rates of school non-reports and how they distribute across
subgroups, warrant close consideration. School non-reporting
behaviors, and what they might imply about how schools exercise
institutional discretion when it comes to student misconduct, are
important and, until this study, were virtually ignored in the empirical
scholarly literature.
When we submit two persistent and key pillars of the school-toprison pipeline hypothesis to data, comparisons of schools’ reporting
and non-reporting behaviors reveal both differences and similarities.
One key difference is that the salience of a school’s SRO/police presence
is comparatively far greater in the school reporting context than in the
non-reporting context. One explanation for this potential divergence is
the possibility that school officials act strategically and, perhaps, in
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coordination with SRO/police officers in terms of when — and under
what conditions — to exercise reporting discretion.254
Second, the school reporting and non-reporting contexts share a
relative absence of strong empirical support for traditional
distributional worries. Specifically, an increase in the percentage of
various traditionally vulnerable sub-groups of students at a school does
not, in general, correspond with a systematic increase in the school’s
likelihood of reporting student misconduct to law enforcement
agencies. While our findings comport with past research using SSOCS
data sets, such findings generally cut against the prominent normative
literature.255 Even though the precise factors that account for school
decisions to either report or not report student misconduct remain
opaque, the distribution of these decisions’ outcomes does not appear
to skew in any traditionally troubling directions. As we note in prior
work, direct evidence of these claims from the SSOCS data set is not
possible owing to the absence of any demographic data (e.g.,
race/ethnicity, gender, socio-economic status) on the students whose
conduct triggered a school decision to either report or not to law
enforcement agencies.256 Despite the absence of more helpful studentlevel demographic data, however, our school-level findings do not raise
any obvious distributional worries.
Instead, our distributional findings comport with more nuanced
studies of racial disparities in the school disciplinary context.
Specifically, racial disparities tend to occur and be more pronounced for
offenses requiring subjectively defined judgment, such as disrespect,
defiance, or disruption, than for offenses that require an objectively
defined judgment, such as possession of drugs or alcohol, fighting, and,
perhaps, threats of physical attack.257 And because most referrals to law
enforcement in the school disciplinary context are for objectivelydefined offenses that are more robust to the effects of implicit racial bias,
it follows that we should and do observe fewer distributional concerns
in this area.258
Going forward, future research on these and other related school-toprison pipeline claims would obviously benefit from more, and richer,
individual-level data, especially as it relates to the individual students
whose conduct triggered a possible school referral to law enforcement
agencies. Another current data deficit relates to information on the
254
255
256
257
258

See KUPCHIK, HOMEROOM SECURITY, supra note 79, at 158.
See George, supra note 11, at 494; Merkwae, supra note 11, at 180.
See Heise & Nance, “Defund the (School) Police”?, supra note 6, at 771.
See Girvan et al., supra note 135, at 394-96, 401; see also supra Parts I.G., I.H.
See Nance, Students, Police, supra note 5, at 968-69.
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criminal justice outcomes for those students whose conduct triggered a
school referral to law enforcement agencies. While it is certainly
plausible to assert that any adverse interaction between a student and a
law enforcement agency is, on balance, negative,259 more granular data
on the formal legal dispositions of these interactions would provide
helpful information for a broader sweep of related research questions.
Finally, as Table 1 makes clear, when it comes to student misconduct,
school non-reporting rates to law enforcement agencies greatly exceed
school reporting rates. As such, and given the obvious and non-obvious
consequences to students as they become involved in the criminal
justice system, closer scholarly and public attention to the contours of
school non-reporting behaviors is warranted. This attention is
particularly crucial given that the student disciplinary reporting context
provides helpful insights into exercises of school discretion more
generally.

259

See supra Part I.E.

